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HARD CASES UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: A 
PROPOSED TAXONOMY OF INTERPRETATIVE 
CHALLENGES 
H. ALLEN BLAIR* 
Words gain their fluctuating meanings from the fluctuating contexts in 
which people put them.1 
INTRODUCTION 
All judges, Frank Easterbrook observes, follow at least one simple 
rule of interpretation: “when the statute is clear, apply it.”2 Although Judge 
Easterbrook makes this observation about the domestic interpretation of 
statutes, it is a fair bet that he would concede its general applicability to the 
interpretation of legal documents around the world. Certainly, with respect 
to the interpretation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
 
 * I would like to thank Kent Greenawalt, Robert E. Scott, Clayton Gillette, and Alejandro M. 
Garro for their advice, comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Article. I would also like to 
thank the Central States Law School Association for providing financial support for the presentation of 
a working draft of the article at the 2009 annual conference. 
 1. Richard Rorty, The Spirit of France’s Great Revolutionary Lives On, TIMES HIGHER ED. 
SUPPL., Nov. 12, 2004, available at http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode 
=192401&sectioncode=26. 
 2. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HAR. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1994). Judge Easterbrook adopts, then, at least a soft formalist distinction between 
what HLA Hart described as a “core of certainty” and a “penumbra of doubt” or a “fringe of 
vagueness.” See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 119–20, 123–26, 128 (1961). As the spatial 
metaphor suggests, the determinacy of a given legal norm is a matter of degree. Nevertheless, Judge 
Easterbrook, like Hart, seems to believe that, at least as a general matter, particular cases can be located 
in one metaphorical space or the other. See id. at 123, 132. For purposes of this Article, I too assume 
that some significant number of cases can be said, at least for many practical purposes, to fall into a 
“core of certainty” and thus can be said to be “easy cases” of interpretation. 
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International Sale of Goods (“CISG”),3 Judge Easterbrook’s rule seems to 
hold true.4 
Beyond this simple rule, however, little consensus exists about the 
interpretation of the CISG in hard cases—cases where a CISG provision is 
vague either on its face or in its application.5 Because the CISG contains 
numerous vague provisions6 and applies to a transactionally-diverse range 
of deals,7 hard cases are not unusual. In fact, “[e]xamples of divergences in 
 
 3. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1984), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG or the Convention] available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html. 
 4. See, e.g., United Nations Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, ¶ 1, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1980/01/19800127%2000-
52%20AM/Ch_XXIII_01p.pdf (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”). 
The CISG is interpreted and applied not only by the domestic courts of each member state but also by 
arbitral panels. For the sake of simplicity, and following the lead of Professor John Honnold, a “giant in 
the field” of CISG scholarship, see Harry Fletchner, Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) as Rorschach Test: The Homeward Trend and Exemption for 
Delivering Non-Conforming Goods, 19 PACE INT’L L. REV. 29, 30 & n.5 (2007) (“Professor Honnold 
served as secretary of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
during the time in which the CISG was developed and led the U.S delegation to the 1980 Vienna 
diplomatic conference at which the final text of the Convention was approved.”), I will generally use 
the term “tribunal” when referring to the courts and arbitral panels interpreting and applying the CISG. 
See JOHN O. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES, 1 
(1989) (“The Convention, faute de mieux, will often be applied by tribunals (judges or arbitrators) . . . 
.”). 
 5. I borrow the term “hard cases” from Ronald Dworkin. According to Ronald Dworkin, “hard 
cases” exist primarily for two reasons: “[s]tatutes and common law rules are often vague and must be 
interpreted before they can be applied to novel cases. Some cases, moreover, raise issues so novel that 
they cannot be decided even by stretching or reinterpreting existing rules.” Ronald Dworkin, Hard 
Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1975). 
 6. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of International Sales 
Law, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 446, 474 (2005) (“[V]ague standards pervade the CISG.”); Juana 
Coetzee, Securing the Future of Electronic Sales in the Context of International Sales, 11 VINDOBONA 
J. INT’L COM. L & ARB. 11, 24 (2007) (“The CISG was drafted in terms that are often considered to be 
vague and that have to be interpreted.”); Larry A. DiMatteo, et. al., The Interpretive Turn in 
International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 299, 320 (2004) (“Many of the CISG articles provide very general, vague default rules tied to the 
concept of reasonableness.”); Craig M. Gertz, The Selection of Choice of Law Provisions in 
International Commercial Arbitration: A Case for Contractual Depecage, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
163, 174 (1991) (“There are . . . numerous examples of provisions in the CISG that offer mere vague 
and uncertain standards.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Adam M. Giuliano, Nonconformity in the Sale of Goods Between the United Staets 
and China: The New Chinese Contract Law, The Uniform Commercial Code, and the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 331, 334 (2006) (“The CISG 
addresses the international sale of moveable goods and encompasses a wide range of transactions and 
related matters . . . .”) (citations omitted); Steven Walt, The State of Debate over the Incorporation 
Strategy in Contract Law, 38 UCC L.J. 255, 264 (2006) (noting that the CISG applies to “a wide range 
BLAIR_PROOF3 3/28/2011  2:53:35 PM 
2011] HARD CASES UNDER THE CISG 271 
the [interpretation and thus] application of nearly all the provisions of the 
CISG abound.”8 
Many commentators believe that the lack of interpretive consensus 
among the various tribunals applying the Convention threatens to 
undermine its express goal of establishing uniform rules to govern 
international commercial contracts and thus remove “legal barriers in . . . 
and promote the development of international trade.”9 Commentators 
supportive of the CISG seek to combat this threat by urging the 
development of “an international community” of tribunals that interpret the 
Convention’s provisions by looking to one another’s decisions and without 
regard to domestic laws or norms.10 Other commentators, who are more 
 
of different types of contracts for the sale of goods”); Charles Sukurs, Harmonizing the Battle of the 
Forms: A Comparison of the United States, Canada, and the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1481, 1483 (2001) (“The CISG is a 
significant treaty because of the breadth of its application to a wide range of international contracts.”). 
 8. Camilla Baasch Anderson, The Uniform International Sales Law and The Global 
Jurisconsultorium, 24 J.L. & COM. 159, 162 (2005). 
 9. CISG, supra note 3, at pmbl.; see, e.g., Aneta Spaic, Approaching Uniformity in International 
Sales Law Through Autonomous Interpretation, 11 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 237, 257 
(2007) (“If domestic tribunals introduce divergent textual interpretations, the CISG will be unsuccessful 
in its goals and its existence will be threatened.”); John Felemegas, Introduction to AN INTERNATIONAL 
APPROACH TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALE OF GOODS (1980) AS UNIFORM SALES LAW 1, 7 (John Felemegas ed., 2007) (“The practical 
success of the Convention depends on whether its provisions are interpreted and applied similarly by 
different national courts and arbitral tribunals.”); Michael Joachim Bonell, The CISG, European 
Contract Law & The Development of a World Contract, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 4–5 (2008) (“The 
importance of the CISG has been questioned on the grounds . . . that in the absence of an international 
tribunal competent to make preliminary rulings on questions concerning its interpretation it . . . risks 
being applied differently in different parts of the world.”); Phanesh Koneru, The International 
Interpretation of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: An Approach 
Based on General Principles, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 105, 106 (1997) (stating that Article 7, which 
assures uniformity of interpretation, “is arguably the single most important provision in ensuring the 
future success of the Convention”); Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity 
Exception to the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 7 
(1993) (“Divergent interpretations of the Convention would lead back to the very uncertainties the 
Convention’s drafters intended to eliminate and would thereby increase the costs of international 
commerce.”). 
 10. See infra Part II.A; see also, e.g., Andersen, supra note 8, at 162; Lisa M. Ryan, The 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Divergent Interpretations, 4 TUL. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 99, 117 (1995) (“Unification of the law of the international community means subjecting 
people from all political, economic, and legal systems of the world to a uniform set of rules and 
principles . . . [and efforts at unification] are undermined by the divergent interpretations of the text by 
countries of different legal traditions.”); Spaic, supra note 9, at 238 (advocating for the “establishment 
of an ‘international legal practice’ consisting of the development of a strong and uniform international 
case law” in order to achieve uniformity of interpretive outcomes); Amy H. Kastely, The Right to 
Require Performance in International Sales: Towards an International Interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention, 63 WASH. L. REV. 607, 651 (1988) (“Courts and commentators should strive to develop an 
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skeptical of the CISG, suggest that non-uniform interpretations have, or 
soon will, completely undermine the Convention, rendering it at best an 
unwieldy obstacle that contracting parties have to avoid and at worst an 
impediment to the future development of a truly useful international sales 
law.11 
Whatever their stance on the merits of the CISG, however, these 
commentators tend to make the same basic assumption: the future of the 
CISG necessarily hinges on tribunals reaching uniform interpretative 
outcomes with respect to all vague CISG provisions. I contend that this 
assumption is flawed.12 It stems from a narrow reading of Article 7 of the 
Convention, the article addressing interpretation of the CISG itself.13 This 
narrow reading recognizes only a binary distinction between vague 
 
international jurisprudence of Convention interpretation which gives detailed content to the notion of 
internationalism in transnational trade law.”). 
 11. For instance, Clayton Gillette and Robert Scott contend that 
In the case of the CISG, the lack of meaningful uniformity is exacerbated by the failure to create 
interpretive mechanisms that, over time, might have given substantive content to the vague default 
standards. The upshot is a treaty whose provisions are likely to become less and less useful as time goes 
on. Indeed, we predict that CISG ultimately will lose out in competition with alternative legal regimes. 
Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 485; see also Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and 
Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 744 (1999) (“I wish to sound a 
skeptical note. Much of the effort directed at unifying [contract laws] is unnecessary, and some 
produces rules that hinder rather than promote international business.”); Gilles Cuniberti, Is the CISG 
Benefiting Anybody?, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1511, 1516 (2006) (“[N]ot only do vague rules not 
provide precise answers and thus reduce legal certainty, but if contained in an international instrument, 
they are also likely to be interpreted differently by courts and thus jeopardize the actual harmonization 
of the field.”); James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law on International Sales, 32 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 273, 276 (1999) (“[T]his article contends that the CISG is actually an obstacle to uniformity 
in the law of international sales.”). 
 12. A few other commentators agree and conclude that uniformity of interpretive outcomes is not 
required by the CISG. See, e.g., Karen Halverson Cross, Parol Evidence Under the CISG: The 
“Homeward Trend” Reconsidered, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 138 (2007) (“More importantly, the language 
and drafting history of the Convention suggest that, notwithstanding Article 7(1), uniformity was not 
the exclusive goal of the CISG project.”). Professor Cross, for instance, argues that Article 7(1) 
requires, at least in part, that “the interpreter . . . be sensitive to the compromises that made adoption of 
the Convention possible.” Id. at 140; see also, e.g., Peter M. Gerhart, The Sales Convention in Courts: 
Uniformity, Adaptability and Adoptability, in THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS REVISITED 77, 80 
(P. Šarčević & P. Volken eds., 2001) (arguing that the CISG’s goal of achieving uniform interpretive 
outcomes must be balanced against the need to ensure the acceptability of the Convention in the long 
term). Similarly, Larry A. DiMatteo has recognized that “[t]he fact that Article 7 prefaces its uniformity 
mandate with ‘regard is to be had’ implies that a standard below strict uniformity in application was 
envisioned.” LARRY A DIMATTEO, LUCIEN J. DHOOGES, STEPHANIE GREENE, VIRGINIA MAURER & 
MARISA ANNE PAGNATTANO, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CISG 
JURISPRUDENCE 11 (2005). While I share these commentator’s concerns, my argument differs 
somewhat from theirs in that my focus is not on the acceptability of the Convention to the member 
states, as such, but to the transacting parties whose deals are or may be governed by the Convention. 
 13. See CISG, supra note 3, at art. 7. 
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provisions involving gaps in coverage of the CISG—so called “internal 
gaps”—and vague provisions involving matters outside of the coverage of 
the CISG—so called “external gaps.”14 All internal gaps must, according to 
this view, be plugged in a uniform manner in order to preserve the stability 
and usefulness of the Convention. Only external gaps, in contrast, can be 
dealt with through recourse to domestic laws and thus handled in non-
uniform ways. This conventional construction of Article 7 ignores a critical 
distinction in internal gap cases between CISG provisions that are 
intentionally vague—”open-textured standards”—and provisions that are 
vague because of drafting imperfections—what I will refer to as “unclear 
rules.”15 
I contend that we need a more nuanced taxonomy of hard CISG cases. 
This more nuanced taxonomy would recognize that uniformity of 
interpretive outcomes is an improper goal in hard CISG cases involving 
open-textured standards.16 Such standards may provide value to contracting 
parties by allowing them to avoid the costs associated with bargaining ex 
ante for more precise rules,17 delegating, instead, to a future tribunal the 
task of deciding whether or not the standard was met.18 Contracting parties 
that accede to a CISG open-textured standard count on future tribunals to 
specify the metric by which compliance with the standard will be measured 
 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See infra Part III.B. 
 16. But see infra Part III (noting that striving for uniform interpretive outcomes with respect to 
unclear CISG rules remains an important goal). 
 17. The “rules versus standards” debate has occupied the attentions of scholars for many years. 
See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Constitutional Adventures in Wonderland: Exploring the Debate Between 
Rules and Standards Through the Looking Glass of the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 830 
(1993) (“[T]he amount of ink spilled over debating the virtues of rules versus standards would lead the 
reasonable observer to believe that something momentous was at stake.”). For good contemporary 
discussions of the distinction, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557, 559–68 (1992) (viewing rules and standards for their economic efficiency); Russell B. 
Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 25 
(2000) (“Rules establish legal boundaries based on the presence or absence of well-specified triggering 
facts.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) 
(“Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value 
choices to be worked out elsewhere.”); FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 13–29 (2009) 
(discussing the relative advantages and disadvantages of legal norms being articulated as rules or 
standards). See generally Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995) (examining relative efficiency of two-party bargaining under rules and 
standards); Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding 
the Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1117 (1999). My goal is not to add substantively to this debate but instead simply to 
observe that both rules and standards can and do have value to contracting parties. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
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on a case-by-case basis, with the advantage of hindsight.19 This method of 
specification means that it is quite possible that a CISG open-textured 
standard will be interpreted to mean one thing in one case and a different 
thing in another. Such non-uniform interpretive outcomes are not only 
acceptable; they may be necessary in order to achieve the efficiency goals 
of the contracting parties.20 
A more nuanced taxonomy of hard CISG cases, in short, should 
recognize that, even with respect to so-called internal gaps, Article 7 
mandates uniformity of interpretive methodology, not necessarily 
uniformity of interpretive outcomes.21 Such a taxonomy would then more 
accurately reflect the substantive design of the Convention, which aims 
primarily at respecting the freedom of contracting parties and reducing the 
costs of international contracting.22 As an ancillary benefit, by helping 
recalibrate expectations about interpretive uniformity, a more nuanced 
taxonomy of hard CISG cases would establish a framework for evaluating 
whether any remaining non-uniformity in the interpretation of unclear 
CISG rules undermines the CISG as a whole. 
This article endeavors to develop such a taxonomy. It proceeds in 
three parts. 
Part I starts by briefly chronicling the development of the CISG and 
outlining its substantive design. Part I contends that the predominate goal 
of the CISG is to help commercial parties maximize their gains from trade. 
The CISG’s substantive design, which places almost no limits on the 
parties’ ability to structure their deal and thus endorses a strong view of 
freedom of contract, rests on the assumption that parties are the best judges 
of how to achieve this maximization. 
Part II turns to an examination of Article 7, which sets out the 
Convention’s interpretive scheme.23 Part II begins by analyzing the 
prevailing view of Article 7(1), which urges tribunals to adopt the so-called 
“autonomous” interpretive perspective, eschewing reliance on domestic 
law and striving, instead, to harmonize their decisions with those of other 
international tribunals applying the CISG. Part II then argues that most 
 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 12, at 19 (“CISG’s interpretive methodology provides a 
template for addressing substantive gaps or issue of law not directly (expressly) dealt with by the 
CISG.”). 
 22. See infra Part I. 
 23. Article 7 lays out interpretive principles applicable to resolve ambiguities in the text of the 
CISG. Article 8 also addresses interpretation, but it deals with interpretive principles applicable to 
resolve ambiguities in the parties’ express contract. CISG, supra note 3, at arts. 7–8. 
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commentators pair Article 7(1)’s autonomous interpretation principle with 
a narrow reading of Article 7(2), which articulates a simple binary 
classification of interpretive challenges. The result is that most 
commentators conclude that tribunals should strive to reach uniform 
interpretive outcomes in all internal gap cases by relying on the precedent 
of other CISG tribunals. 
Part III introduces the proposed new taxonomy of hard CISG cases. It 
begins by arguing that the conventional picture of CISG interpretation fails 
to recognize the value of open-textured standards. Relying on the 
conclusion reached in Part I that the CISG embraces a particularly strong 
vision of freedom of contract, Part III contends that contracting parties 
acceding to application of the CISG may well want tribunals to interpret 
open-textured CISG defaults in the context of the particular deal and 
without regard to the interpretations of those same defaults issued by other 
tribunals. Maximizing party welfare, in other words, may require that 
tribunals engage in ex post, context-dependent interpretation and 
specification of open-textured standards. Part III then turns to an 
articulation of the proposed new taxonomy of hard CISG interpretive cases. 
It observes that there are three—instead of two—broad types of hard CISG 
cases, each of which contains two subcategories. With respect to two of 
these subcategories, the goal of uniform interpretive outcomes is improper 
given the value of default standards to contracting parties. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY AND DESIGN OF THE CISG 
A remarkable achievement, the CISG represents the culmination of 
more than half a century of labor.24 While a complete history of the CISG 
is well beyond the scope of this Article,25 this Part begins by concisely 
recounting the CISG’s development, highlighting some of the key 
rationales behind the creation of a uniform international sales law. In so 
doing, it will show that the perhaps the most fundamental premise of the 
Convention is that parties are the best judges of their welfare. Part I 
concludes by observing that the basic structure and contents of the 
Convention embrace a particularly robust conception of freedom of 
 
 24. See Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law, 24 GA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 183, 184–85 (1994); see also Joseph Lookofsky, Digesting CISG Case Law: How Much 
Regard Should We Have?, 8 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 181, 181 (2004) (arguing that the 
CISG stands as UNCITRAL’s greatest achievement since it was established in 1966). 
 25. For more about the negotiating history of the Convention, see generally CESARE M. BIANCA & 
MICHAEL J. BONNELL, COMMENTARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES 
CONVENTION (1987); HONNOLD, supra note 4; Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 265 (1984). 
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contract. This Part lays the foundation for my argument in Part III that a 
more nuanced taxonomy of hard cases will align more appropriately with 
the general principles of the CISG than the conventional view of 
interpretation. 
A. Solutions through Compromises: The Genesis of a Uniform 
International Law of Sales 
During the past two centuries, the world has become a much smaller 
place to do business. As the world of global commerce has shrunk, the 
desire for a uniform sales law has grown.26 At the very least, hopeful 
prognostications about the viability or existence of such a uniform law have 
not been in short supply. More than 250 years ago, for instance, Lord 
Mansfield declared that “mercantile law . . . is the same all over the world. 
For from the same premises, the sound conclusions of reason and justice 
must universally be the same.”27 The mercantile law Lord Mansfield 
referred to has often been called the lex mercatoria,28 a practical body of 
customary law created by the merchants and commercial courts throughout 
Europe in the sixteenth century.29 By the nineteenth century, however, 
whatever uniformity existed through the lex mercatoria30 had given way to 
 
 26. See, e.g., Ronald Harry Graveson, The International Unification of Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 4, 
4 (1968) (“The international process of assimilating the diverse legal systems of various countries goes 
back into ancient history.”). 
 27. Pelly v. Royal Exch. Assurance Co., 97 Eng. Rep. 342, 346 (1757). 
 28. “Lex Mercatoria” translates to “law merchant,” which is defined as “[a] system of customary 
law that developed in Europe during the Middle Ages and regulated the dealings of mariners and 
merchants in all the commercial countries of the world until the 17th century.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 966 (8th ed. 2004). For more on the history of the lex mercatoria, see THEODORE F.T. 
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 657, 657–70 (5th ed. 1956); Harold J. Berman 
& Colin Kaufmann, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex mercatoria), 19 HARV. 
L.J. 221, 225 (1978). 
 29. See Ferrari, supra note 24, at 184–85. Broadly speaking, there were at least five characteristics 
of the lex mercatoria: 
Its special characteristics were that it was first of all transnational. Secondly, it was based on a common 
origin and a faithful reflection of the mercantile customs. Thirdly, it was not administered by 
professional judges but by merchants themselves . . . . Fourthly, its procedures were speedy and 
informal and finally fifthly, as overriding principles, it emphasized freedom of contract and decision of 
cases ex aequo et bono. 
Gesa Baron, Do the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts Form a New Lex 
Mercatoria?, PACE DATABASE ON THE CISG AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW pt. II(1) ¶ 3 
(June 1998), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/baron.html. 
 30. There may be historically sound reasons to doubt whether the lex mercatoria, assuming that it 
existed at all, was as uniform as Lord Mansfield suggested. See, e.g., Sieg Eislen, Adoption of the 
Vienna Convention for the International Sale of Goods (the CISG) in South Africa, 116 S. AFR. L. J. 
323, 333 (1996) (“Whether the idea that the lex mercatoria of the Middle Ages formed a uniform sales 
code that was universally and consistently applied throughout Europe at the various fairs and markets is 
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contract laws promulgated by nations.31 Most countries had developed, or 
were developing, their own, often complex, internal laws governing both 
domestic and international contracting and sales.32 The result was that 
international sellers and buyers were, through application of conflict of law 
rules, subjected to an uneven and often unpredictable patchwork of 
domestic regulations.33 
By the close of the nineteenth century, this patchwork meant that 
goods were more expensive than they needed to be. Though international 
trade was expanding quickly, the potential for a true global economy was 
stymied by the costs associated with complying with these complex and 
frequently contradictory regulations.34 A nostalgic yearning for a return to 
the uniform, if not always simple, rules of the lex mercatoria inspired 
reformers, at the end of the nineteenth century, to begin creating an 
international code governing sales.35 The animating idea behind this code 
was to “overcome the nationality of [commercial] law.”36 
 
historically well founded is arguable.”); M.J. MUSTILL & S. BOYD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 81 (2d ed. 1989) (expressing doubt about the existence of a 
lex mercatoria). 
 31. See, e.g., Noel Cox, The Law of Arms in New Zealand, 18 NZ U.L. REV. 225, 255 (1998) 
(“The decline of the Staple Courts, where the lex mercatoria or law merchant was administered, was 
largely due to Sir Edward Coke, who oversaw the acquisition by the common law Courts of most of the 
commercial litigation from the early part of the seventeenth century.”). 
 32. See CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF, CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF’S SELECT ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW 25–26 (Jiarui Zheng ed., 1988). 
 33. Private international law at this point in history was considered to be complicated, abstract and 
had the reputation of being the “nuclear physics of jurisprudence.” Bruno Zeller, Four-Corners – The 
Methodology for Interpretation and Application of the UN Convention for the International Sale of 
Goods (May 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Melbourne), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/4corners.html#15 (last updated May 19, 2003). 
 34. See, e.g., Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (1993) (“The 
primary motive for the drafters’ toil . . . was their belief that the ‘diversity of municipal laws’ applicable 
to contracts for the international sale of goods posed a ‘serious obstacle to the free exchange of 
goods.’”) (citations omitted). 
 35. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Formation of International Sales Contracts: Three Attempts at 
Unification, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 305, 305 (1962) (“In an age of diversity among legal systems, we can 
look back with nostalgia to the hegemony of the law merchant, when commercial men could order their 
affairs according to an international body of custom which was applied with some consistency.”); see 
also MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW-THE 
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 3 (1994) (discussing the 
justifications for the development of harmonized international commercial law); Ernst Von Caemmerer, 
The Influence of the Law of International Trade on the Development and Character of the Commercial 
Law in the Civil Law Countries, in THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 90 (Clive M. 
Schmitthoff ed., 1962) (“[W]henever the private law is splintered into many jurisdictional fragments, 
the need for uniformity shows up most strongly in the field of commercial law.”). 
 36. Ferrari, supra note 24, at 184–85. 
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In 1926, Ernst Rabel made a specific, if somewhat limited, proposal to 
codify a uniform law of sale.37 An early draft of this project was adopted in 
1939 by the council of the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (“UNIDROIT”).38 The Second World War, however, hindered 
further developments until 1951, when this draft was tabled at the Hague 
Conference on the Unification of Sales Law.39 In 1956, a special 
commission appointed by the Conference prepared and presented another 
version of this draft, which was then reworked several times until finally, 
on April 25, 1964, the conference members adopted two conventions, the 
Convention for the Uniform Law of International Sales (“ULIS”) and the 
Convention for the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (“ULF”).40 While neither of these early 
predecessors to the CISG was widely adopted outside of Europe,41 they 
paved the way for drafting the CISG by a working group of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), which 
saw the participation of delegates from sixty-two countries and observers 
from eight international organizations.42 This group’s work started in 
earnest by the early 1970s and finished in 1980.43 
Ultimately then, it is not an overstatement to say that the CISG 
resulted from the dedicated work of many different drafters making 
contributions over the course of the twentieth century. In the eyes of some, 
the CISG has “surpassed all expectations,” coming to “represent[] the most 
successful attempt to unify an important part of the many and various rules 
of the law of international commerce.”44 Others point out that it is, in the 
 
 37. Sieg Eiselen, Adoption of the Vienna Convention for the International Sale of Goods (the 
CISG) in South Africa, 116 S. AFR. L. J. 323, 334 (1996); see also, e.g., Peter Huber, Comparative Sales 
Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 940 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann 
eds., 2006); Michael Joachim Bonell, Introduction to the Convention, in COMMENTARY ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA CONVENTION 3 (Cesare Massimo Bianca & Michael 
Joachim Bonell eds., 1987) (acknowledging Rabel’s involvement in the development of UNIDROIT 
and early efforts at the unification of sales law). 
 38. See Eiselen, supra note 37, at 334. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER 1980 UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION 5 (4th ed. 2009). 
 42. See Eiselen, supra note 37, at 336. 
 43. See id. 
 44. Peter Schlechtriem, Preface, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) at v (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d ed. 
2005); see also Peter Huber, Some Introductory Remarks on the CISG, 6 INTERNATIONALES 
HANDELSGERICT 227, 227 (2006) (“It is therefore fair to say that the CISG has in fact been one of the 
success stories in the field of the international unification of private law.”); E. Allan Farnsworth, 
Developments in Contract Law During the 1980's: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203, 204 
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end, a document filled with compromises designed to make it amenable to 
the legal systems whose representatives adopted it.45 Despite these 
compromises, or perhaps because of them, the Convention has been 
adopted by seventy-three states from all five continents,46 including many 
of the world’s major trading nations.47 As a result, most global sales 
transactions concerning goods are subject to the same set of rules. And, as 
the next section observes, a standardized set of legal rules, like the CISG, 
for international sales transactions confers significant benefits on 
contracting parties, saving them time and money by eliminating the need to 
learn about and negotiate over potentially competing legal regimes. 
Perhaps more importantly, a standardized set of rules focused on freedom 
of contract, as the next section notes that the CISG is, allows the parties 
flexibility to tailor their arrangements in ways that many domestic legal 
regimes may not. 
B. Solutions through Agreements: Freedom of Contract and the CISG’s 
Design 
As the previous section suggests, widespread agreement on the need 
for a uniform law in international sales transactions has been recognized.48 
This broad consensus rests on the intuition that a uniform sales law confers 
 
(1990) (stating that the harmonization of international commercial law was one of the “Top Ten” 
developments in contract law during the 1980s). 
 45. See, e.g., Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 23 INT’L L. J. 443, 481 (1989) (stating that the provisions 
of the CISG are more “the result of a compromise rather than a consensus”); Monica Kilian, The CISG 
and the Problem with Common Law Jurisdictions, 218 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 217, 217–18 (2001) 
(“CISG is the culmination of years of work spanning most of the 20th Century, representing 
compromises and solutions amenable to all legal systems whose representatives adopted the 
Convention.”); Karen Halverson Cross, Parole Evidence Under the CISG: The “Homeward Trend” 
Reconsidered, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 133, 139 (2007) (“A number of scholars have observed that the many 
open-ended terms and ambiguities in the Convention were the result of numerous political compromises 
reached during the drafting process.”); Koneru, supra note 9, at 105 (“[M]any of [the Convention’s] 
provisions reflect the difficult negotiations and compromises the drafters had to make.”). 
 46. The CISG entered into force a seventy-third country, Armenia, on January 1, 2010. The 
Convention also entered into force in Lebanon on December 1, 2009, and in Japan on August 1, 2009. 
See UNCITRAL, Status: 1980–United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/ 
1980CISG_status.html (last visited March 22, 2011). 
 47. The United Kingdom and India have not adopted the CISG. See id. 
 48. See generally, e.g., Rene David, The International Unification of Private Law, in 2 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (1971); HONNOLD, supra note 41, at 3–4. But 
see, e.g., Ronald Harry Graveson, The International Unification of Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 4, 5–6 
(1968) (stating that “it may be necessary to correct the assumption that uniform law is good in itself and 
that the process of unification is one to be encouraged in principle” and advancing the argument that 
certain preconditions must be satisfied to warrant development of uniform laws). 
BLAIR_PROOF3 3/28/2011  2:53:35 PM 
280 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 21:269 
significant benefits on contracting parties. The following section argues 
that this intuition, in turn, stems from an acknowledgement that most sales 
law rules are intended to become default terms to the extent that parties 
either choose to have, or wind up having because of unforeseen exigencies, 
gaps in their agreement.49 After briefly recounting this default rule 
paradigm, this Part concludes by pointing out that virtually all of the rules 
in the CISG are non-mandatory defaults and thus that the CISG embraces a 
robust norm of freedom of contract. 
1. The Default Rule Paradigm and an International Sales Law 
Peter Pfund, the acting Assistant Legal Adviser for Private 
International Law for the United States Department of State, presented a 
1984 speech to the Senate in support of the adoption of the CISG.50 In his 
speech, Pfund argued that the CISG would allow U.S. corporations to 
engage in trade with foreign nations and enter into sales that they otherwise 
would not have.51 Pfund suggested that without a uniform sales law like the 
CISG, U.S. corporations would be dissuaded by the costs associated with 
determining what legal regime would govern their international sales 
contracts and the unavoidable uncertainties that overlapping legal regimes 
created.52 
Pfund’s arguments recognized that parties to contracts generally, and 
international sales contracts especially, face a significant knowledge 
problem. Contracts, as drafted, are always incomplete.53 The inevitability 
of incompleteness reflects, to borrow a distinction from H.L.A. Hart, both 
our “relative ignorance of fact” and “our relative indeterminacy of aim.”54 
 
 49. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of 
the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 276, 278 (1985). 
 50. International Sale of Goods, 1984: Hearing on Treaty Doc. No. 98–9 Before the S. Comm. on 
Foreign Relations, 98th Cong. 303-05 (1984) (statement of Peter Pfund acting Assistant Legal Adviser 
for Private International Law, Department of State). 
 51. See id. at 6. 
 52. See Heidi Stanton, How to Be or Not to Be: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, Article 6, 4 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423, 428 (1996) (“In light 
of these uncertainties, difficulties and expenses, what were once attractive foreign markets suddenly 
appear unattractive.”). 
 53. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Default Rule Project, 6 VIR. J. 84, 85 (2003) (“As an 
organizing principle, the notion that contract rules are defaults inevitably leads to the conclusion that all 
contracts are inevitably incomplete.”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L. J. 541, 595 (2003) (“There is an infinite number of possible future 
states and a very large set of possible partner types. When the sum of possible states and partner types is 
infinite and contracting is costly, contracts must contain gaps. Parties cannot write contracts about 
everything.”). 
 54. HART, supra note 2, at 135; see also Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules 
and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 822 (1992) (“Parties drafting a contract confront a 
BLAIR_PROOF3 3/28/2011  2:53:35 PM 
2011] HARD CASES UNDER THE CISG 281 
Although many contracts, and most international sales contracts, are 
negotiated and entered into by sophisticated parties, often acting with the 
assistance of counsel, and although contracts often contain detailed and 
extensive provisions seemingly addressing all of the possible future 
contingencies that might arise, no contract accounts for every future 
contingency.55 
First, the costs of attempting to conceive of and negotiate contract 
provisions regarding every contingent state of the world might well exceed 
the resulting gains from the transaction.56 Such costs include not only the 
expense of gathering information about future possibilities, but also 
expenses associated with drafting and negotiating provisions to address 
each future contingency and error costs, which arise when parties attempt 
to draft a clear provision dealing with some future state of the world but 
actually draft a provision that is vague or unclear and that results in costly 
litigation.57 
Second, the costs of enforcing provisions, even if the contingent state 
of the world can be anticipated and a provision regarding the contingency 
can be drafted efficiently, may outweigh the benefits of the transaction, 
 
serious knowledge problem. Because they cannot foresee every future event or know precisely how 
their own purposes may change, they cannot negotiate terms specifically to cover all contingencies.”). 
 55. Importantly, a contract may be “obligationally” complete by providing for an obligation that 
applies in a wide range of circumstances. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete 
Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 190 (2005) [hereinafter 
Scott & Triantis, Incomplete Contracts]. For instance, a contract might provide that, no matter what, a 
seller must deliver 2,000 widgets on January 1, 2010, for a price of $10,000. While such a contract is 
free from gaps in the sense that it specifies the parties’ rights and obligations in all states of the world, 
the contract remains “informationally” incomplete in the sense that the parties cannot know whether 
delivery of the widgets on that date and for that price will truly be efficient. See id.; see also, e.g., 
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L. J. 814, 
n.2 (2006) [hereinafter Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation]. 
A contract may be obligationally complete even though it is informationally incomplete. An 
obligationally complete contract might lump together various states and provide for the same 
obligations across the states of each lumped set. Yet, such a contract is informationally incomplete 
because it fails to discriminate within each set between states of the world that, optimally, call for 
different obligations. States of the world reflect both exogenous and endogenous variables. For 
example, different oil prices produce different states, but so does the decision of a seller to tender or 
not. Each event changes the state of the world and may be paired in the contract with a different 
obligation on the buyer. 
 56. As Clayton Gillette explains, “[t]he passage of time renders complete contracting both 
difficult and undesirable, for the costs of allocating risks deemed unlikely to materialize at all, or only 
in the distant future, tend to exceed the current value of expected losses from the remote event.” 
Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 
J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 535 (1990). 
 57. See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostrisky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of 
Opportunism Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation, 96 KY. L. J. 43, 58 (2007) (“Error costs 
arise when courts make erroneous interpretations of words having a variable meaning.”). 
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making a complete contract ultimately inefficient.58 For instance, in some 
circumstances, verifying to a court or tribunal that the provision has been 
breached may require access to information that is prohibitively costly to 
obtain. This may be true even if the costs for the parties of observing that 
the provision has been breached are low.59 In short, because contracts, as 
drafted, are always incomplete, contractual default rules exist to help fill 
the gaps.60 
These defaults, in turn, promote trade and corresponding gains by 
reducing transaction costs, fostering legal neutrality, predictability, and 
stability, and improving the accessibility of the law.61 In these respects, a 
uniform international sales law does not differ appreciably from a uniform 
domestic sales law.62 Presumably, however, as Peter Pfund observed, a 
uniform international set of default rules, like the CISG, is more efficient 
for international transactors than a patchwork of domestic laws because it 
reduces or eliminates costs associated with reaching agreement on a choice 
of law, ex ante (or, of addressing conflict of laws rules in the absence of 
 
 58. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 
468 (1980) (“[B]ecause of the costs involved in enumerating and bargaining over contractual 
obligations under the full range of relevant contingencies, it is normally impractical to make contracts 
which approach completeness.”). 
 59. Information may be said to be unobservable if the other contracting party cannot perceive it. 
Information may be observable but not verifiable if the other party can perceive it but cannot, at a 
reasonable case, prove that information to a court or other third party. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A 
Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1642 n.2 (2003); see also 
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent 
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1791–95 (1996) (discussing the distinction between 
observable information, which is information that it is both possible and worthwhile for transactors to 
obtain, and verifiable information, which is information that it is worthwhile for transactors to prove to 
a designated third-party neutral in the event of a dispute). 
 60. See Scott, supra note 53, at 85. 
 61. See, e.g., Jernej Sekolec, Digest of Case Law on the UN Sales Convention: The Combined 
Wisdom of Judges and Arbitrators Promoting Uniform Interpretations of the Convention, in THE DRAFT 
UNCITRAL DIGEST AND BEYOND: CASES, ANALYSIS, AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE U.N. SALES 
CONVENTION 1–2 (Franco Ferrari et al. eds., 2004) (maintaining that these benefits of reduced 
transaction costs are contingent upon uniform interpretation of the CISG); Frank Diedrich, Maintaining 
Uniformity in International Uniform Law via Autonomous Interpretation: Software Contracts and the 
CISG, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 303, 305 (1996) (describing the CISG as an “ideal compromise” in 
contrast to local or domestic law and predicting the potential benefits from applying the CISG rather 
than domestic law to international software contracts); Filip De Ly, Opting Out: Some Observations on 
the Occasion of the CISG's 25th Anniversary, in QUO VADIS CISG? - CELEBRATING THE 25TH 
ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE 
OF GOODS 26, 40 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2005) (arguing that the CISG “entails a reduction of transaction 
costs, facilitates contract management and has psychological and cross-cultural advantages over 
domestic sales law”). 
 62. See, e.g., Goetz et al., supra note 49, at 276, 278 (explaining that domestic default rule sets 
governing sales transactions are public goods that maximize the joint welfare of contracting parties by 
reducing transaction costs). 
BLAIR_PROOF3 3/28/2011  2:53:35 PM 
2011] HARD CASES UNDER THE CISG 283 
agreement, ex post),63 and the costs of learning about foreign legal 
regimes.64 Additionally, an international set of default rules could contain 
provisions that offer parties greater flexibility and freedom of contract than 
otherwise applicable domestic default rules would offer. 
Recognizing that a set of international sales default rules can 
theoretically produce value, however, does not necessarily resolve what the 
content of the rules should be.65 The process by which lawmakers can and 
should determine the substance of sales default rules has, in fact, been a 
subject of heated discussion in contract-theory literature, especially over 
the last two decades.66 For the purposes of this Article, I assume that most, 
though not all, default rules are best understood as attempts by law makers 
to anticipate terms that most similarly situated parties would have wanted 
to include had they thought about them.67 Such majoritarian defaults 
maximize the probability that the terms to which transacting parties are 
being held correspond with the ones they intended but failed to express or 
imply, and they save the majority of parties the costs of specifying those 
 
 63. See, e.g., Peter Winship, Commentary on Professor Kastely’s Rhetorical Analysis, 8 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 623, 629–30 (1988). 
 64. See Diedrich, supra note 61, at 304–05 (viewing the CISG as a preferable alternative to 
interpreting contracts via one party’s domestic laws or even a neutral domestic law). 
 65. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 396, 396 (2009) (“How to fill gaps in incomplete agreements is perhaps the most important 
question in contract law.”). 
 66. For a particularly good introduction to the subject, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling 
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) 
(applying game theory to the question of how lawmakers should create contract default rules to 
facilitate efficient contracts); see also, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the 
Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990) (employing game theory, but 
challenging Ayres and Gertner’s conclusions); Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1993) (featuring 17 pieces on theoretical perspectives on contract default 
rules); Barnett, supra note 54 (discussing the default rule approach to gap-filling); Jules L. Coleman et 
al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639 (1989) (applying an economic analysis to default rules); Ian Ayres, 
Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1391 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)). 
 67. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 53, at 596 (“The justification for a default rule is that it 
does for parties what they would have done for themselves had their contracting costs been lower.”). 
Not all defaults fit this model, of course. Some defaults may be purposefully set, in fact, to something 
that the parties would not want in order to induce them to exchange information that they otherwise 
might not. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 65, at 91 (explaining penalty defaults are 
“purposefully set at what the parties would not want--in order to encourage the parties to reveal 
information to each other or third parties”). Additionally, some defaults may exist to protect vulnerable 
parties or non-parties who are impacted or potentially impacted by a contractual exchange. 
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terms.68 In designing a set of defaults, then, there are at least two critical 
dimensions that must be considered.69 
First, and perhaps most significantly, lawmakers must determine the 
extent to which the law should contain immutable or mandatory 
background rules70 in contrast to non-mandatory defaults that supply a term 
unless the parties opt out.71 This choice will ultimately reflect the 
lawmakers’ view about the degree of contractual freedom that the parties 
 
 68. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 
J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 607 (1990) (contending that majoritarian defaults promote efficiency “by 
providing widely suitable preformulations, thus eliminating the cost (and the error) of negotiating every 
detail of the proposed agreement”). The majoritarian default rule approach favors an “objective 
conception of rationality,” and seeks to mimic “a risk allocation the majority of similarly situated 
rational actors would have devised were they to bargain costlessly over the question in advance.” Id.; 
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in 
Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1477 (2004) [hereinafter Scott & Triantis, Embedded 
Options]. (“The case for majoritarian default rules in contracts rests on the premise that state 
institutions, such as courts and legislatures, sometimes can design contract provisions at lower cost than 
the parties could themselves.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 396 (4th ed. 1992) 
(stating that default rules should “supply[ ] standard contract terms that the parties would otherwise 
have to adopt by express agreement”); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: 
Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983) (stating that 
lawmakers should create default terms by asking, “[W]hat arrangements would most bargainers prefer?” 
(emphasis in original)); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical 
Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 361 (1988) (positing that default rules should provide “the contract that 
most well-informed persons would have adopted if they were to bargain about the matter”); Coleman et 
al., supra note 65, at 641 (describing this as a hypothetical bargain approach to contractual gaps where 
the goal is to find the rule that “the parties would have made had transaction costs not made their doing 
so irrational”). 
 69. It is possible to conceive of more dimensions. For instance, Professor George Geis has pointed 
out that default rules may be more or less “granular,” applying to a precise range of parties or applying 
to most or all contracting parties. See George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of 
Default Rules, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1109, 1111–12 (2006) (giving the example of the UCC’s differential 
treatment of merchants and non-merchants in some situations); see also, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The 
Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 390–91 (1993) 
(identifying six categories of contract defaults). 
 70. Immutable rules are not variable by the parties. There are several reasons for the law to 
impose immutable rules that cannot be contracted out of, as Ayres and Gertner explain. “There is 
surprising consensus among academics . . . on two normative bases for immutability. Put most simply, 
immutable rules are justifiable if society wants to protect (1) parties within the contract, or (2) parties 
outside the contract.” Ayres & Gertner, supra note 66, at 88. 
 71. See id. at 87. Courts (and other legal decision-makers) become involved in supplying default 
rules when the parties fail to resolve a matter by express contract ex ante. Questions of the legitimacy of 
legal intervention in such cases and the appropriate framework to use in supplying terms are examined 
in Coleman et al., supra note 66; see also, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and 
Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 783, 790–91 (1992) (critiquing Jules Coleman’s rational bargaining theory as a basis for 
choosing default rules and elevating importance of consent theory); Goetz & Scott, supra note 62, at 
266–70 (examining the way in which the system of state-supplied terms interferes with contractual 
innovation). 
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should enjoy. Contracting parties, of course, are more limited in their 
freedom if the default set contains more mandatory background rules. On 
the other hand, parties can choose to ignore non-mandatory default rules by 
adopting, in their contract, workable alternatives. Non-mandatory defaults, 
in essence, assume that contracting parties are the best judges of how to 
maximize joint welfare and allow them to tailor their contracts to suit their 
transaction-specific preferences. “By enacting a [non-mandatory] default 
rule to govern a contingency . . . lawmakers implicitly render a 
determination that the desires of the parties to a transaction will be 
permitted to take precedence over other policy concerns.”72 
Second, lawmakers must decide whether to frame default norms as 
rules or standards.73 I discuss this dimension of default rules at length in 
Part III, but for now it is sufficient to note that parties regularly choose to 
employ a mix of rules and standards when they craft express terms to their 
deal.74 It is, thus, reasonable to conclude that both rules and standards can 
be advantageous to parties. On first glance, at least, it is not then apparent 
whether the default rule set should be comprised of rules or standards or 
some combination of the two.75 
With respect to the first dimension, as the next section argues, the 
drafters of the CISG chose to adopt an almost exclusively non-mandatory 
default set. Indeed, the CISG embraces an expansive view of contractual 
freedom, allowing parties whose contracts are governed by its provisions to 
have virtually unfettered discretion to adjust the default rules governing 
their transactions. With respect to the second dimension, as Part III 
discusses, the CISG drafters chose to cast, in significant measure, the 
default set as standards rather than rules. 
2. The CISG’s Structure and Contents: An Expansive View of 
Contractual Freedom 
 
 72. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 
611 (1998). 
 73. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 1, 3 (1993) (arguing that default rules may be categorized as being simple rules, 
complex rules, simple standards or complex standards). 
 74. See, e.g., Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 457 (“To be sure, commercial parties often include 
broad standards of reasonableness or effort in their contracts. Commercial contracts regularly invoke 
factors such as ‘best efforts,’ ‘reasonable expenses,’ and ‘reasonable withholding of consent.’”). 
 75. Notably, as I discuss in more detail in Part III, Professors Gillette and Scott argue to the 
contrary. They maintain that the default rule set should be comprised primarily of rules and that “the 
parties can always include [standards] in their contract at relatively low cost” when such standards are 
efficient. See id. 
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Though the CISG establishes a fairly straightforward normative 
framework for international sales contracts,76 its design is innovative. The 
innovation rests, as the previous section suggested, on the Convention’s 
fundamental commitment to a robust freedom of contract.77 This 
commitment can be seen most obviously in Article 6, which states 
concisely but powerfully that “[t]he parties may exclude the application of 
the Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of 
any of its provisions.”78 
The debates at the 1980 conference confirm that Article 6 is to be 
taken literally and that parties may indeed derogate from or vary the effect 
of all the provisions of the Convention other than Article 12.79 
Accordingly, “Article 6 guarantees party autonomy over both the conflict 
rules and the substantive law.”80 
The right of the parties to contract out of the Convention entirely 
implements a generally recognized principle of private international law 
according to which the parties to an international contract of sale of goods 
 
 76. Although CISG has a wide scope of application, applying “to contracts of sale of goods 
between parties whose places of business are in different [contracting] States,” it also has significant 
limitations. CISG, supra note 3, art. 1(1). First, it does not apply to consumer transactions or mixed 
contracts for the sale of goods and services where the services are the “preponderant part of the 
obligations of the party who furnishes the goods.” See id. at art. 2(a) & 3(2). Similarly, it does not apply 
to the sale of certain kinds of property, such as stocks, shares, investment securities, money, electricity 
or ships, vessels or aircraft. Id. at art. 2(b)-(f). The Convention “does not apply to the liability of the 
seller for death or personal injury caused by the goods to any person,” id. at art. 5, and Article 4 
explains that matters of contract validity and the effect of a contract on property rights in the goods sold 
are beyond the scope of the convention. Id. at art. 4. Instead, the Convention “governs only the 
formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from 
such a contract.” Id. at art. 4. Accordingly, the CISG does not address unconscionability, capacity 
defenses, fraudulent inducement or the rights of a bona fide purchaser to goods that turn out to have 
been stolen. 
 77. See Tom McNamara, U.N. Sale of Goods Convention: Finally Coming of Age?, 32 COLO. 
LAW. 11, 16 (2003) (“Many Convention commentators have argued that the most fundamental provision 
of the Convention is the ‘freedom of contract’ principle.”); see also, e.g., Richard D. Kearney, 
Developments in Private International Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 724, 728 (1987) (noting that freedom of 
contract is a fundamental tenant of international sales law); Franco Ferrari, Remarks on the Autonomy 
and the Uniform Application of the CISG on the Occasion of its Tenth Anniversary, INT’L CONTR. ADV. 
33 (1998); JAN RAMBERG, Autonomy of Contract and Non-mandatory Law, in SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES 
IN LAW 143 (1993); Ulrich Schroeter, Freedom of Contract: Comparison Between Provisions of the 
CISG (Article 6) and Counterpart Provisions of the Principles of European Contract Law, 11 
VINDOBONA J. INT’L COMM. L. & ARB. 259, 260 (2002) (discussing at length the notion of freedom of 
contract embraced by the CISG). 
 78. CISG, supra note 3, art. 6. 
 79. Peter Winship, The Scope of the Vienna Convention on the International Sale Contracts, in 
INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALE OF GOODS 1, 32 (Nina M. Galston & Hans Smit, eds., 1984). 
 80. PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW: THE UN-CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 35 (1st ed. 1986). 
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are permitted to choose the applicable law.81 In the absence of a uniform 
law, however, the parties’ choice, of course, was restricted to existing 
domestic laws. Article 6 makes it clear that, despite the existence of the 
Convention, contracting parties remain free to decide what should be the 
proper law governing their transaction. Accordingly, Article 6’s opt-out 
provision, while significant, is not particularly novel. 
The right of derogation and variation, however, is innovative. Even 
where the Convention applies as the proper law of the contract, the parties, 
pursuant to Article 6, may adapt the Convention to their particular needs 
with virtually no limitations.82 They may do so by excluding some of the 
Convention’s provisions, agreeing on contractual terms to supplement the 
Convention, or modifying the provisions of the Convention. Although 
many domestic sales laws grant the parties at least some freedom to 
achieve similar outcomes,83 such laws tend to contain more mandatory 
terms.84 
 
 81. See, e.g., Diedrich, supra note 61, at 306–07 (noting that parties to an international sales 
contract can choose the law applicable to their transaction pursuant to “the universally recognized 
principle of party autonomy under non-unified private international law”); Francis A. Gabor, Stepchild 
of the New Lex Mercatoria: Private International Law from the United States Perspective, 8 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 538, 542 (1988) (noting that a survey of conflict of law rules “leads to the conclusion 
that the principle of choice of law freedom of the parties is almost universally recognized at the present 
time”). 
 82. See, e.g., Lachmi Singh & Benjamin Leisinger, A Law for International Sale of Goods: A 
Reply to Michael Bridge, 20 PACE INT’L L. REV. 161, 164 (2008) (“It logically follows from this that the 
parties are free to tailor specific provisions of the CISG to their needs.”); Peter Winship, Aircraft and 
International Sales Conventions, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 1053, 1060 (1984) (“[The CISG’s] rules are 
supplementary in nature and the parties have virtually unlimited freedom to contract out of some or all 
of the convention’s rules if they so choose.”); Arthur Fakes, The Application of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods to Computer, Software, and Database 
Transactions, 3 SOFTWARE L.J. 559, 574 (1990) (“The parties may agree in their contract that the 
Convention does not apply to the transaction and thereby nullify its operation. In fact, the parties can 
eliminate or alter the application of specific treaty provisions by including in the contract the altered or 
totally different terms. Such capabilities illustrate the extreme flexibility of the treaty and its gap-filler 
nature.”). A few commentators, however, argue that, in addition to Article 6’s express declaration that 
the parties may not derogate from or vary the application of Article 12, the CISG contains several 
mandatory defaults that parties should not be able to change by agreement. See, e.g., Bojidara Borisova, 
Freedom of Contract: Remarks on the Manner in Which the UNIDROIT Principles May be Used to 
Interpret or Supplement Article 6 of the CISG, in AN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE 
INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALES OF GOODS (1980) AS UNIFORM SALES LAW 39, 44 (John Felemegas ed., 2007). 
 83. For instance, the UCC provides that, with some exceptions, “[t]he effect of provisions of this 
Act may be varied by agreement.” U.C.C. § 1-302; see also id. §§ 4-103(a); 4A-501(a); 5-103(c). 
 84. For instance, the UCC has a number of mandatory defaults including, among many others, the 
statute of frauds. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (the obligation of good faith and fair dealing); id. § 1-302 (the 
parol evidence rule); id. § 2-202 (statute of limitations); id. §§ 2-725, 2A-506, 3-118, 4-111, 5-115, 6-
110, and certain rules regarding warranties and disclaimers; see also id. §§ 2-316 (prohibiting the 
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Perhaps more importantly, even if a domestic default rule is non-
mandatory, it may well be “sticky.”85 In other words, parties might find 
themselves locked into the default even though they might prefer some 
alternative provision. Such stickiness might result from a variety of causes, 
including an inordinate focus on the status quo or a concern about negative 
signaling.  As I argue in more detail in Part III.B, however, there are good 
reasons to believe that Article 6 helps render default norms under the CISG 
far less sticky, allowing parties virtually unfettered freedom to opt-out of 
them when doing so will maximize the parties’ joint contract surplus. 
Article 6 is an alerting rule—a rule that tells “private parties the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for contracting around a default,”86 and those 
conditions are extremely minimal. 
In short, then, Article 6 serves the dual purposes of allowing parties 
the freedom to opt in or out of the CISG entirely and allowing the parties 
who do opt into the CISG to tailor specific provisions to meet their 
individual transactional goals. When paired with the Convention’s 
underlying goal of reducing the costs of international sales and thus 
enhancing the welfare of contracting parties, this commitment to freedom 
of contract demonstrates that the drafters of the CISG intended to promote, 
first and foremost, the intentions of the contracting parties, allowing them 
to design their deals in whatever ways would maximize their perceived 
gains from trade. As the next two Parts argue, the conventional 
understanding of hard CISG interpretation cases potentially undermines 
this fundamental premise by attempting transform the default rule set from 
standards into rules. 
II. THE CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE CISG’S 
INTERPRETATIVE SCHEME 
The CISG has been widely adopted.87 The United States did so in 
1986, making the CISG a self-executing treaty.88 Since coming into force 
 
negation or limitation of express warranties and imposing strict rules on governing other warranty 
disclaimers). 
 85. See generally, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006) (discussing the stickiness of contract default rules). 
 86. Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 6 (2006). 
 87. See UNCITRAL, supra note 46. 
 88. HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS §23:6 (Supp. 2007). By making the 
CISG self-executing, Congress intended for it to have automatic domestic effect as federal law upon 
ratification. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n. 2 (2008) (“What we mean by ‘self-
executing’ is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification.”). 
BLAIR_PROOF3 3/28/2011  2:53:35 PM 
2011] HARD CASES UNDER THE CISG 289 
in 1988,89 more than 5000 court and arbitral decisions applying the CISG 
from forty countries have been rendered.90 Although a large and expanding 
membership to the CISG promises to formally increase the harmonization 
of international sales law, diversity of membership means that hundreds of 
different tribunals from different countries are tasked with the obligation of 
interpreting that law. The problem, of course, is that “even when outward 
uniformity [of rules] is achieved, . . . uniform application of the agreed 
rules is by no means guaranteed, as in practice different countries almost 
inevitably come to put different interpretations upon the same enacted 
words.”91 Or, to put it more succinctly, “[e]ven if you get uniform law, you 
won’t get uniform results.”92 
Critics of the CISG have, in fact, highlighted the threat of uneven 
application, arguing that the benefits of uniform international sales law are 
minimal.93 But even supporters of the CISG have recognized that national 
courts will inevitably be the conscious or subconscious victims of 
“homeward trend.”94 The CISG, in other words, 
will often be applied by tribunals . . . who will be intimately 
familiar only with their own domestic law. These tribunals, 
regardless of their merit, will be subject to a natural 
tendency to read the international rules in light of the legal 
ideas that have been imbedded at the core of their 
intellectual formation. The mind sees what the mind has 
means of seeing.95 
Such a homeward trend, most commentators agree, tends to erode the 
uniformity of the CISG with “[d]ivergent or contradictory interpretations, 
like the application of rules of different countries lead[ing] to different 
judgments.”96 Indeed, commentators have gone so far as to claim that “the 
single most important source of non-uniformity in the CISG is the different 
 
 89. See Joanne M. Darkey, A U.S. Court's Interpretation of Damage Provisions Under the U.N. 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Preliminary Step Towards an 
International Jurisprudence of CISG or a Missed Opportunity?, 15 J.L. & COM. 139, 139 (1995) 
(discussing the details about how the convention came into force). 
 90. See PACE DATABASE, supra note 29. 
 91. R.J.C. Munday, The Uniform Interpretation of International Conventions, 27 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 450, 450 (1978). 
 92. John Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action -- Uniform International Words: Uniform 
Application?, 8 J.L. & COM. 207, 207 (1988). 
 93. See, e.g, Stephan, supra note 11, at 746–50. 
 94. John Honnold coined the term “homeward trend,” suggesting that it is a regrettable but 
inevitable consequence of the unification process. HONNOLD, supra note 4, at 1. 
 95. Id. at 1. 
 96. László Réczei, Process and Value of the Unification of Commercial Law: Lessons for the 
Future Drawn from the Past 25 years, 25th UNCITRAL Congress 6 (1992). 
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background assumptions and conceptions that those charged with 
interpreting and applying the Convention bring to the task.”97 
To combat this homeward trend, commentators, or at least 
commentators in favor of the continued existence of the CISG, have read 
Article 7 of the CISG and its interpretive scheme narrowly, finding that 
there are only two basic categories of hard cases: internal gap and external 
gap cases. They then insist that, with respect to the larger category of hard 
cases—cases falling within the scope of the Convention but not expressly 
settled by it—tribunals must interpret the CISG “autonomously,” looking 
only to the decisions of other tribunals interpreting the CISG, using the 
CISG’s general principles to deduce the correct interpretation, and avoiding 
the tendency to look to or rely on domestic contract law for guidance. By 
eschewing reliance on domestic law, at least for the largest category of 
interpretive challenges, it is hoped that tribunals will ultimately build an 
independent, internationally consistent set of interpretive outcomes under 
the Convention. 
The next two sections discuss, in some detail, this conventional 
understanding of the CISG’s interpretive framework, focusing on Article 
7(1) and 7(2). The third section in this part concludes by providing a brief 
summary of the conventional approach and highlighting its shortcomings. 
A. Article 7(1) 
“Article 7 of the Convention itself undertakes the formidable task of 
guiding judges.”98 Described by some as “the single most important 
provision in ensuring the future success of the Convention,”99 Article 7(1) 
states: “(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its 
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith in international trade.”100 
Ascertaining precisely what Article 7(1)’s exhortation regarding the “need 
 
 97. Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations 
on Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. 
& COM. 187, 200 (1998); see also Harry M. Flechtner, Funky Mussels, A Stolen Car, and Decrepit 
Used Shoes: Non-Conforming Goods and Notice Thereof Under the United Nations Sales Convention 
(“CISG”), 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (2008) (“The most significant challenge arising from the CISG’s 
success is how to maintain the Convention as a source of uniform international sales rules (its primary 
function) when it is being applied by courts, arbitral tribunals and lawyers in such a large group of 
countries with diverse domestic legal cultures.”) [hereinafter Flechtner, Funky Mussels]; Spaic, supra 
note 9, at 239–40 (“The main issue with respect to the CISG’s divergent interpretation lies with the 
interpreters themselves, the different courts and tribunals who are likely to be influenced by national 
legal concepts and legal systems.”). 
 98. Koneru, supra note 9, at 106. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, supra note 3, art. 7. 
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to promote uniformity” means, however, has proven difficult.101 Certainly 
Article 7(1) encourages member states to keep in mind the nature and 
aspirations of the Convention, but it is unclear whether a distinction should 
be drawn between Article 7(1)’s emphasis on the need for uniformity and 
its call for recognition of the international character of the CISG.102 Some 
commentators maintain that “the need to promote uniformity” is no more 
than “a logical consequence” of interpreting the Convention according to 
its “international character.”103 Indeed, Professor Aneta Spiac has argued 
that “[i]n the CISG, the elements of ‘internationality’ and ‘uniformity’ are 
interrelated thematically and structurally because of their position in the 
same Part and Article of the CISG.”104 Regardless of whether or not the 
two criteria are completely coextensive, however, Paragraph 1 of the 
Secretariat Commentary to the 1978 draft seems to confirm that the two 
criteria in Article 7(1) are, at the least, complementary: 
National rules on the law of sales of goods are subject to 
sharp divergencies [sic] in approach and concept. Thus, it is 
especially important to avoiding differing constructions of 
the provisions of this Convention by national courts, each 
dependent upon the concepts used in the legal system of the 
country of the forum. To this end Article 7 emphasizes the 
importance, in the interpretation and application of the 
provisions of the Convention, of having due regard for the 
 
 101. Much of the commentary on Article 7(1) focuses on the meaning of what might be considered 
the provision’s central term, “good faith.” See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty 
Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 686, 778–82 (1998) (discussing the disagreements over the meaning 
of good faith arguing that it should have an expansive role in the CISG and should be regarded as a 
“general principle” under Article 7(2)); Harry Flechtner, Comparing the General Good Faith 
Provisions of the PECL and the UCC: Appearance and Reality, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 295, 289–301 
(2001). Notably, however, “good faith” is not defined in the Convention—it is not “even accompanied 
by a definition as indefinite as the ‘observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing,’ the 
definition of good faith within the Uniform Commercial Code.” Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, 
The Political Economy of International Sales Law, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 446, 452 (2005). 
 102. For example, Professor John Honnold initially distinguishes the two principles but then 
discusses only the legislative history of the criterion regarding the Convention’s “international 
character.” See HONNOLD, supra note 41, at 117–20. 
 103. See Bonell, supra note 37, at 72. Professor Fletchner similarly seems to agree that the two 
criteria are effectively coextensive. According to Professor Flechtner, the drafters of the CISG sought 
“to avoid, where possible, terminology commonly used in (and thus more likely to convey unintended 
meanings derived from) domestic sales law, particularly where the terminology is associated with a 
particular legal tradition.” Flechtner, supra note 96, at 5. This drafting technique, he goes on to say, 
reflects “the effort to create sales rules that will be interpreted and applied ‘autonomously’—i.e., in a 
fashion (as expressed in Article 7(1)) that reflects the Convention’s ‘international character’ and the 
need for ‘uniformity in its application.’” Id. at 5–6. 
 104. Spaic, supra note 9, at 241. 
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international character of the Convention and the need to 
promote uniformity.105 
Accordingly, most commentators agree that subdivision (1) generally 
encourages local and national courts and tribunals to develop an 
“internationalist culture.”106 Because of its freedom from domestic norms, 
the interpretive methodology derived from such an internationalist culture 
has somewhat confusingly been referred to as the “autonomous” approach 
to interpretation.107 
Significantly, however, this autonomous approach, despite its name, 
does not suggest that a tribunal is barred from considering the decisions of 
other tribunals faced with similar CISG interpretive challenges. In fact, the 
autonomous interpretive approach encourages, if not compels, tribunals to 
consider what other tribunals interpreting the CISG have done.108 Most 
CISG commentators—and an increasing number of national courts—agree 
that the command ‘to have regard’ requires that particular consideration be 
given to CISG ‘foreign case law’, i.e., relevant decisions emanating from 
 
 105. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
Prepared by the Secretariat, Official Records, art. 6, cmt. 1., Prepared for the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.97/5 (1979). 
 106. ALAN P. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 3 (2d ed. 1999); see also Alexander S. 
Komarov, Internationality, Uniformity and Observance of Good Faith as a Criteria in Interpretation of 
CISG: Some Remarks on Article 7(1), 25 J.L. & COM. 75, 76 (2005) (“[I]t was also stressed that a 
considerable merit of the paragraph would lay in the fact that it proclaimed an up-to-date legal policy in 
harmony with the exigencies of world trade which postulated that ‘no recourse to national law should 
be admitted in interpretation.’”). 
The drafters of the CISG, in fact, attempted to avoid “as far as possible the use of what may be called 
legal shorthand, that is, the use of terms of art peculiar to the system of law prevailing in one group of 
countries signing a convention.” OTTO CHARLES GILES, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LAW: AN ESSAY ON 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 39 (1970). They wanted, instead, to develop a 
“neutral language” that could replace the idioms used by national legal systems with an international 
system designed to reflect the realities of commercial life. See, e.g., CESARE M. BIANCA & MICHEAL J. 
BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 
74 (1987) (“Even in the exceptional cases where terms or concepts were employed which are peculiar to 
a given national law, it was never intended to use them in their traditional meaning.”). 
 107. Komarov, supra note 105, at 78. 
 108. See, e.g., Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra note 44, at 64–65. HONNOLD, supra note 41, at 
125 (“The Convention’s requirement of regard for ‘uniformity in its application’ calls for tribunals to 
consider [foreign] interpretations of the Convention.”); Flechtner, Funky Mussels, supra note 96, at 2 
(“There is consensus among CISG commentators that one important tool in fulfilling [the requirement 
of uniformity] is consultation of past CISG decisions, particularly those rendered by tribunals in 
jurisdictions other than that of the interpreter.”); Spaic, supra note 9, at 240 (“Thus, uniformity can only 
be achieved if different tribunals take into consideration the decisions of other national courts on the 
same set of circumstances.”); Franco Ferrari, CISG Case Law: A New Challenge for Interpreters?, 17 
J.L. & COM. 245, 254 (1998) (“The interpreter must consider decisions rendered by judicial bodies of 
foreign jurisdictions, because it is possible that the same or similar questions have already been 
examined by other States’ courts.”). 
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courts in (other) CISG Contracting States.109 Thus, instead of having a store 
of domestic case law, commentators advocate for the creation of an 
international body of precedent (though admittedly nonbinding)110 to which 
tribunals can look to determine the outcome of a given case.111 This 
approach emphasizes “awareness of and respect for, but not necessarily 
blind obedience to, interpretations of the CISG from outside one’s own 
legal culture.”112 
In circumstances where there are diverging interpretations by different 
tribunals, the principles of autonomous interpretation suggest that the 
interpreting tribunal should harmonize such decisions. “[C]ourts [should 
serve] two primary functions [in their roles as informal appellate courts]. 
First, they would look to decisions of foreign courts for guidance. Second, 
they would actively unify international sales law by distinguishing 
seemingly inconsistent prior decisions and by harmonizing differences in 
foreign interpretations.”113 
Perhaps not surprisingly, however, harmonization has proven 
challenging.114 Because “the CISG judicial ‘pyramid’ is essentially flat, no 
court sits atop with the authority to iron out differences in opinion among 
the numerous . . . judicial hierarchies spread across the globe.”115 
Nevertheless, many commentators maintain that all tribunals are tasked 
 
 109. See, e.g., Franco Ferrari, International Sales Law and the Inevitability of Forum Shopping: A 
Comment on Tribunale Di Rimini, 26 November 2002, 23 J.L. & COMM. 169, 172 n.12 (2003-2004). 
 110. See, e.g., Singh & Leisinger, supra note 81, at 180–81 (noting that “there is no such a thing as 
‘stare decisis’ with regard to interpretations of provisions of the CISG by courts or tribunals in other 
countries”); Ferrari, supra note 107, at 259–60 (criticizing the notion that foreign CISG case law should 
have the value of precedent). 
 111. See Franco Ferrari, Applying the CISG in a Truly Uniform Manner: Tribunale di Vigevano 
(Italy), 12 July 2000, 6 UNIFORM L. REV. / REVUE DE DROIT UNIFORME, 203, 206 (2001). 
 112. Flechtner, supra note 96, at 188; see also, e.g., Koneru, supra note 9, at 108 (“[I]t is important 
to recognize that giving an international interpretation does not mean merely choosing a domestic 
interpretation from another country.”). 
 113. Larry A. DiMatteo, et. al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of 
Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 304 (2004). 
 114. Joseph Lookofsky, In Dubio Pro Conventione? Some Thoughts about Opt-Outs, Computer 
Programs and Preëmption Under the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (CISG), 13 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 263, 269 (2003) (“So while we find many examples of harmonious Convention interpretation, 
the CISG musicians do not all play the same tune; indeed, domestic idiosyncrasies sometimes make it 
difficult for outsiders to a given national system to even ‘hear’ the message sounded by foreign 
precedent.”). 
 115. Joseph Lookofsky, Digesting CISG Case Law: How Much Regard Should We Have?, 8 
VINDOBONA J. OF INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 181, 185 (2004). 
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with the job of doing their utmost to separate the mellifluent from the 
discordant in CISG interpretive matters.116 
In short, most commentators read Article 7(1) as an attempt to limit 
jurisdictional variance by admonishing tribunals to heed the CISG’s 
“international character.” In this role, these commentators view Article 7(1) 
as a succinct restatement of the underlying legis ratio, or purpose, of the 
entire convention.117 As the next section argues, most commentators 
maintain that, when paired with Article 7(2), the international character of 
the entire convention demands that the autonomous method, including 
recourse to an international store of precedent, be used to resolve all 
internal gap cases. 
B. Article 7(2) 
Article 7(2) establishes the basic categories of interpretive challenges 
that tribunals face when dealing with the CISG. This subdivision states that 
it is addressing “matters governed by this Convention [but] not expressly 
settled in it.”118 It goes on to declare that such matters “are to be settled in 
conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the 
absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue 
of the rules of private international law.”119 
This statement of scope, I contend, implicitly delineates three basic 
categories of “matters”: 
First, there are matters governed by the Convention but settled in it 
(Category I Cases). 
Second, there are the matters expressly being dealt with by the 
subdivision—matters that are governed by the Convention but not settled in 
it (Category II Cases). 
 
 116. See id.; Flechtner, Funky Mussels, supra note 96, at 9–10 (“The deference due a CISG opinion 
is based on how well it satisfies Article 7(1)’s mandates to interpret the Convention with regard to its 
international character and the need to promote uniformity in its application.”). 
 117. “Ratio legis” refers to the purpose or “soul” of the law. 
[I]t is not the words of the law, but the internal sense of it that makes the law, and our law (like all 
others) consists of two parts, viz. of body and soul, the letter of the law is the body of the law, and the 
sense and reason of the law is the soul of the law, quià ratio legis est anima legis. And the law may be 
resembled to a nut, which has a shell and a kernel within, the letter of the law represents the shell, and 
the sense of it the kernel, and as you will be no better for the nut if you make use only of the shell, so 
you will receive no benefit by the law, if you rely only upon the letter, and as the fruit and profit of the 
nut lies in the kernel, and not in the shell, so the fruit and profit of the law consists in the sense more 
than in the letter. 
Eyston v. Studd, Plowden, 75 Eng. Rep. 459, 465 (1573). 
 118. CISG, supra note 3, art. 7(2). 
 119. Id. 
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Third, there are matters not governed by the Convention, either 
because they are expressly or implicitly excluded (Category III Cases). 
Importantly, questions about Category I Cases are generally not hard, 
implicating, as they do, Judge Easterbrook’s universal rule of 
interpretation—if the statute is clear, apply it. Accordingly, this article does 
not address Category I Cases. Questions about Category II and III Cases, 
however, may be hard. In fact, Category II Cases are quintessential hard 
CISG cases and the primary focus of this Article. 
1. Matters Governed by But Not Settled in the CISG (Category II 
Cases) 
To date, most commentators and tribunals have treated all questions 
about Category II Cases as homogenous. Interpretive challenges arising 
from Category II matters involve so-called intra legem or internal gaps.120 
Such gaps are formed, according to one view, 
when the legislator is not aware of a problem. The reason 
for this is often that the problem did not exist at the time the 
law was made. The problems arise out of a change in the 
conditions of life caused by technical progress. It is also 
possible that the legislator simply overlooked the 
problem.121 
Internal gaps, then, may be seen as sorts of mistakes, albeit 
understandable and even inevitable ones.122 As is often true with mistakes 
in general, the goal of conventional approaches to CISG interpretation is to 
permanently fix such mistakes. 
Another view sees internal gaps as simply byproducts of the necessary 
concessions that were made in order to get the Convention ratified.123 The 
drafters, in other words, did not overlook problems so much as they looked 
 
 120. See Ferrari, supra note 36, at 215–21. 
 121. Gert Brandner, Admissibility of Analogy in Gap-filling and its Relationship to the General 
Principles under the CISG, CISG DATABASE, PACE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW 
(1999), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/brandner.html#N_25_. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Karen Halverson Cross, Parole Evidence Under the CISG: The “Homeward Trend” 
Reconsidered, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 133, 139–40 (2007); Koneru, supra note 9, at 5 (“[M]any of [the 
Convention’s] provisions reflect the difficult negotiations and compromises the drafters had to make.”); 
Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, 23 INT’L L. 443, 450–52 (1989) (discussing in some detail the need for 
compromise during the drafting of the CISG). 
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away from them in order to get broad-ranging agreement on the content of 
the Convention.124 
Even if this later explanation of internal gaps more accurately reflects 
the drafting history of the Convention than the “mistake” view, however, 
the bottom line is the same: commentators believe that tribunals 
interpreting the Convention should, over time, permanently fill the gaps left 
as a result of the drafting process. For instance, Professor Kastely, in an 
early article discussing the Convention, argued that “[c]ourts and 
commentators should strive to develop an international jurisprudence of 
Convention interpretation . . . [which will] articulate the detailed meanings 
of the general principles of the Convention.”125 Thus, over time, the 
general, open-ended provisions of the Convention would slowly be 
transformed into a set of clear and detailed rules.126 Similarly, Professor 
Spaic argues that “[t]he creation and adoption of the CISG are only the 
preliminary steps towards uniformity in international sales law. It is the 
interpretation—and uniform application—of the uniform law that will 
complete the process.”127 
To fill the gaps, the conventional view of the CISG’s interpretive 
scheme reads Article 7(2) as establishing a two-tier hierarchy. First, 
tribunals are directed to settle a question about a matter falling into 
Category II hard CISG Cases in conformity with the Convention’s general 
principles.128 Second, only if no such principles can be found (“in the 
absence of such principles”), can a tribunal look to some domestic contract 
law—a domestic law “applicable by virtue of the rules of private 
 
 124. See, e.g., Garro, supra note 123, at 471–73 (discussing the “uneasy” compromise reached 
regarding notice of noncomformity and arguing that this compromise, which hinges on several open-
ended terms like “reasonable,” was necessary to accommodate the competing visions of the drafters). 
 125. Amy H. Kastely, The Right to Require Performance in International Sales: Towards an 
International Interpretation of the Vienna Convention, 63 WASH. L. REV. 607, 651 (1988) (emphasis 
added). 
 126. In this respect, Professor Kastely’s argument may reflect the widely accepted notion that the 
relationship between rules and standards is dialectical, at least in common law systems where precedent 
accretes over time. As standards are applied by courts, they acquire increasing specificity, slowly 
becoming more rule-like. See, e.g., Wilson Huhn, The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy 
and Realism, 48 VILL. L. REV. 305, 376–79 (2003) (also observing that rules, over time, tend to become 
more standard-like as courts question the application of specific norms to particular facts). 
 127. Spaic, supra note 9, at 258 (emphasis added). 
 128. Obviously, the question of how courts should ascertain what counts as a “general principle” 
has generated a great deal of scholarly thought. See, e.g., Koneru, supra note 9, at 115–23 (discussing 
appropriate methods for ascertaining the general principles of the Convention); JOHN O. HONNOLD, 
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 102 (2d ed. 1991) (suggesting that general principles should 
only be found to exist when they are “moored to premises that underlie specific provisions of the 
Convention”). 
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international law”129—to resolve the question.  In other words, it is “[o]nly 
as a last resort” that a tribunal may settle the matter in accord with the 
“domestic law indicated by the conflict of law rules of the forum” and thus 
interpret a case in a non-uniform manner.130 
The method by which tribunals are to ascertain the content of the 
“general principles” of the CISG, in turn, while not self-evident, has been 
widely accepted to be the autonomous method detailed in the previous 
section.131 Tribunals, in other words, should adopt an interpretive 
perspective, whenever possible, that views the CISG as self-contained.132 
 
 129. CISG, supra note 3, art. 7(2). 
 130. Alejandro M. Garro, The Gap-Filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International Sales 
Law, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1149, 1156 (1995). Ironically, this approach potentially results in there being an 
intra legem gap. Theoretically (and very likely in many actual cases), a court might be able to deduce 
one or more underlying principles of the CISG relevant to an interpretive question. These principles, 
however, may conflict or ultimately prove to be insufficient to answer the question. Read narrowly, 
subdivision (2) might prohibit a court from resorting to the forum’s domestic law in such a case, since a 
principle is available. 
It is worth noting that, according to the late E. Allan Farnsworth, who represented the United States on 
the CISG drafting committee, Article 7(2) was a compromise between civilian and common-law 
traditions: 
The more numerous civilians had some success. What they got, in article 7(2), was this: “Questions 
concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in 
conformity with the general principles on which it is based” . . . . But we common lawyers also had 
some success. What we got, in the balance of article 7(2) was this: “In the absence of such principles, 
[matters not expressly settled by the Convention are to be settled] in conformity with the law applicable 
by virtue of the rules of private international law.” Here is a recognition of the Swiss cheese theory: 
Look at the Convention as a piece of Swiss cheese, and, if you see a hole in the Convention, look 
through it to the backdrop of the law that would otherwise apply under choice of law rules. This 
concession to the common lawyers was all the more remarkable because the predecessor of the Vienna 
Convention--the less widely adopted Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods--had said exactly 
the opposite. 
E. Allan Farnsworth, A Common Lawyer’s View of His Civilian Colleagues, 57 LA. L. REV. 227, 231 
(1996). 
 131. CISG, supra note 3, art. 7(1). Many commentators, it should be noted, argue that the principle 
of autonomous interpretation permeates the entire Convention. See, e.g., Komarov, supra note 105, at 
76–77 (“The general observation of means of interpretation of the Convention may be supplemented by 
the reference to an interesting remark relating to evaluation of the rule stipulated in Article 7(1). It was 
suggested that because most of the articles, if not all, manifest a purpose and the policy, in a sense the 
entire Convention is a cross-reference to this article.”) (citing Robert A. Hillman, Applying the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: The Elusive Goal of Uniformity, 
in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 21 (Cornell 
Int’l Law Journal ed. 1995). It is not, therefore, merely a product of the conjunction of Articles 7(1) and 
7(2). 
 132. See, e.g., SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 44, at 10 (finding it imperative for 
interpreters of the CISG to become familiar with uniform international concepts, and to “understand 
them as autonomous concepts and to counter the danger of their being interpreted in the light of the 
familiar solutions of domestic law”); BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 25, at 74 (having regard to the 
“international character” of the Convention under Article 7(1) “implies the necessity of interpreting its 
terms and concepts autonomously, i.e., in the context of the Convention itself and not by referring to the 
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Autonomous interpretation, according to these scholars, must divorce itself 
from domestic law as an influence on questions of CISG interpretation. 133 
Most commentators agree that, as an initial matter, the CISG’s general 
principles can and should be filled by analogical extensions of specific 
provisions.134 These general principles can also be derived from scholarly 
works on the CISG, and more controversially, many argue that they can be 
found within the UNIDROIT Principles.135 The general principles, 
however, are seen as fixed answers that may be used, once found, to 
permanently plug interpretive gaps left by the Convention’s vague 
language. 
In brief, the conventional approach to CISG interpretive challenges 
arising from an internal gap—arising because a matter falls within the 
scope of the Convention but it is not settled by it—strives to fill the gaps 
left by the Convention drafters both for purposes of the pending case and 
for all future cases. The primary mechanism for accomplishing this goal is 
the autonomous principle of interpretation, which should be, in the 
conventional commentators’ view, applied to all hard cases arising from 
internal gaps. By following the autonomous interpretation principle in all 
 
meaning which might traditionally be attached to them within a particular domestic law”); Franco 
Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 183, 200–
01 (1994) (arguing that Article 7(1) requires the interpreter to read the Convention, “not . . . through the 
lenses of domestic law, but . . . against an international background”). 
 133. See Franco Ferrari, Applying the CISG in a Truly Uniform Manner: Tribunale di Vigevano 
(Italy), 12 July 2000, 6 REVUE DE DROIT UNIFORME [UNIFORM L. REV.] 203, 204 (2001); John E. 
Murray, Jr., The Neglect of CISG: A Workable Solution, 17 J.L. & COM. 365, 367 (1998) (stating that 
autonomous interpretation requires that a tribunal “transcend its domestic perspective and become a 
different court that is no longer influenced by the law of its own nation state”). 
 134. See, e.g., Franco Ferrari, Interpretation of the Convention and Gap Filling: Article 7, in 
DRAFT UNCITRAL DIGEST 138, 160 (Franco Ferrari et al. eds., 1989); FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH 
MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 58–59 (1992). 
 135. See John Felemegas, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods: Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation, in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 115, 291–94 (Pace Int’l L. Rev. ed., 2001) (asserting that 
the UNIDROIT principles have been and should continue to be applied by tribunals to interpret the 
CISG); Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts and the CISG: 
Alternative or Complementary Instrument?, 1 UNIF. L. REV. 26, 33–36 (1996) (arguing that the 
UNIDROIT Principles may be used to interpret and supplement some aspects of the CISG); Ulrich 
Magnus, General Principles of UN-Sales Law, 59 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT (Ger.) 492 (1995) 
(characterizing the UNIDROIT Principles as “additional general principles” in the context of the CISG 
because of correspondence between them and the provisions and general principles of the CISG). But 
see Ferrari, supra note 133, at 170–71 (arguing that supporting comments are often accompanied by a 
warning that the UNIDROIT Principles go further than the CISG); Troy Keily, Good Faith and the 
Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 3 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. LAW 
& ARB. 15, 35 (1999) (describing the argument that the UNIDROIT Principles can provide general 
principles for use in CISG interpretation as “flimsy” and reiterating the warning that UNIDROIT 
Principles go “well beyond the CISG”). 
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such cases, it is believed that interpretive outcomes can be normalized 
across signatory states. 
2. Matters Not Governed by the Convention (Category III Cases) 
Just as tribunals and commentators have treated questions about 
Category II Cases as homogenous, so too have they treated all questions 
about matters falling into Category III as homogenous. Matters falling into 
the third category are outside of the scope of the CISG. They fall into what 
have been described (somewhat confusingly) as external gaps or gaps 
praeter legem.136 Because the CISG does not address questions related to 
matters falling into these external gaps, the standard view is that they may 
be directly settled by domestic law. 
Though these external gaps are classified, initially, the same, some 
commentators recognize that there are differences in the natures of these 
gaps. Accordingly, the ascertainment of which domestic law will be 
applied will depend on the type of external gap the tribunal faces. If the 
external gap is one of procedural law, recourse will be had to the law of the 
forum.137 For other types of external gaps, some commentators have 
suggested that the appropriate domestic law should be that made applicable 
by the rules of private international law.138 
For purposes of this Article, the important point is that commentators 
believe that the only truly acceptable non-uniformity of interpretive 
outcomes exists with respect to external gaps. 
C. Brief Summary of the Conventional Approach to CISG Interpretive 
Challenges 
The conventional approach to CISG interpretation, in short, relies on 
Article 7(1) to derive the overarching goal of uniformity of interpretative 
outcomes as well as the methodology for achieving this goal—autonomous 
interpretation.139 Article 7(1) requires consideration of the CISG’s 
“international character” and the “need to promote uniformity” in its 
 
 136. See Franco Ferrari, Uniform Application and Interest Rates Under the 1980 Vienna Sales 
Convention, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 467, 471 (1995). 
 137. See, e.g., MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, S.P.A., 144 F.3d 
1384, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 138. See, e.g., Shrivbir S. Grewal, Risk of Loss in Goods Sold During Transit: A Comparative 
Study of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the Uniform 
Commercial Code, and the British Sale of Goods Act, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 93, 102 
(1991) (stating that, generally, the question of who carries the burden of proof is to be determined by 
the choice of law rules of the forum, not the Convention). 
 139. See id. at 95–106. 
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application.140 This implies that the CISG’s legislative history, international 
case law, and scholarship should inform courts and tribunals applying its 
provisions.141 Unlike the common law, in which legislation traditionally is 
strictly read,142 the CISG’s “international character” and “need to promote 
uniformity” invites a more flexible, purposive approach.143 
Most tribunals and commentators then rely on subdivision (2) of 
Article 7, however, to distinguish between only two categories of hard 
cases: cases involving questions about matters governed by the CISG but 
not expressly settled by it (Category II matters) and cases falling outside of 
the coverage of the CISG (Category III matters).144 All Category II 
interpretive matters should be resolved uniformly and permanently; only 
Category III matters may be decided in a non-uniform and case-by-case 
matter. Thus, the goal of CISG autonomous interpretation, with respect to 
all Category II matters, should be the crystallization, over time, of uniform 
and definitive rules. This crystallization should occur, to be sure, at the 
international level and without regard to domestic legal norms, but 
ultimately, the goal should be a set of definitive interpretive outcomes that 
all tribunals, the world around, can apply uniformly. As the next part of this 
Article argues, however, while the two identified categories of hard cases 
are important, they are not the only types of hard cases that tribunals 
interpreting the CISG face. By starting with a narrow view about the goals 
of interpretation and the possible types of interpretive challenges tribunals 
face, tribunals and commentators have created unnecessary confusion as 
they try to stuff all hard cases into one of two boxes. 
III. A NEW TAXONOMY OF INTERPRETIVE CHALLENGES 
Professor Philip Hackney wrote an article ten years ago entitled Is the 
United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods Achieving 
Uniformity?145 In the article, Professor Hackney provided an answer: 
 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See, e.g., Michael Joachim Bonell, Article 7, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES 
LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 65, 77–78 (Cessare Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim 
Bonell eds., 1987) (stating that in common law systems, statutes are interpreted “in a very strict sense” 
and that general principles derived from case law are used for statutory gap-filling as opposed to the 
civil law approach of deriving general principles from the legislation itself). 
 143. See Grewal, supra note 138, at 95–106; see also Kilian, supra note 45, at 228–29 (stating that 
“[n]arrow interpretation . . . does not sit well with the international character of the Convention”). 
 144. See Grewal, supra note 138. 
 145. Philip Hackney, Is the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
Achieving Uniformity?, 61 LA. L. REV. 473 (2001). 
BLAIR_PROOF3 3/28/2011  2:53:35 PM 
2011] HARD CASES UNDER THE CISG 301 
maybe.146 Following Professor Hackney’s invitation, this article provides 
another answer: it depends. I contend that if by “uniformity” one means 
uniformity of interpretive outcomes, then the answer is an unequivocally 
“no.” If, however, by “uniformity” one means uniformity of procedural or 
methodological interpretation, then the answer may well be “yes.” After all, 
most commentators and tribunals seem to agree that the proper method of 
addressing CISG interpretive disputes is the autonomous method.147 I too 
agree that the autonomous method should be used. I argue, however, in this 
Part that the CISG was never intended to achieve the goal of uniformity of 
interpretive outcomes in all hard CIG cases. 
Significantly, my argument differs from similar sounding arguments 
made by skeptics of the CISG or those proponents of the CISG that aim to 
justify the Convention’s uneven application by maintaining, in essence, that 
the CISG is better than nothing.148 Rather than maintaining either that the 
CISG is failing because it has not, and likely cannot, promote uniformity of 
interpretive outcomes or that the CISG remains a valiant, if ultimately 
pyrrhic, effort to give the world a framework for promoting relatively 
uniform interpretive outcomes, I contend that many of the CISG’s key 
provisions invite, and may well require, that tribunals reach case-specific 
and contingent interpretations that may differ across jurisdictions and 
among contracts. 
Accordingly, this Part begins by explaining why rational international 
contracting parties might want open-standard terms to govern portions of 
their relationships. Relying on the path-breaking work of Professors Robert 
Scott and George Triantis in Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 
this Part argues that all contracting parties design their deals by making 
tradeoffs between investing in ex ante specification of contract rules or 
postponing detailed specification of performance requirements by adopting 
standards. By including an optimal mix of rules and standards, contracting 
parties maximize their perceived joint welfare. Given that standards have 
value precisely because they require ex post and individuated specification, 
an important goal of the CISG—promoting freedom of contract and 
corresponding gains from trade—could be eroded if, as many 
commentators want, CISG standards were slowly hardened into more 
precise rules. 
 
 146. See id. at 479–81. 
 147. See supra notes 108-117. 
 148. See, e.g., Johan Steyn, A Kind of Esperanto?, in THE FRONTIERS OF LIABILITY 14–15 (Peter 
Birks, ed. 1994) (“No convention can eliminate uncertainties in its application. But a convention such 
as the Vienna Sales Convention will tend to reduce differences and to eliminate uncertainty.”). 
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This Part then offers a taxonomy of hard CISG cases that recognizes 
the value of open-textured standards to contracting parties. More 
specifically, this Part argues that three, rather than merely two, general 
types of hard CISG cases exist. First, there are cases where a tribunal 
determines that a matter is governed by the Convention but “not expressly 
settled in it.” Second, there are cases where a tribunal determines that a 
matter was governed by the Convention but has been altered by the parties 
pursuant to Article 6. Finally, there are cases where a tribunal will 
determine that a matter falls outside of the ambit of the Convention. The 
real innovation of the proposed taxonomy, however, is in the recognition 
that each of these types of hard cases includes one or more subtypes, two of 
which need not be, and in fact should not be, interpreted with the goal of 
achieving uniform outcomes. 
A. The Value of Open-Textured Standards 
Contrary to the standard view of CISG interpretation and of intra 
legem gaps, in particular, not all vague CISG provisions are equal. Some 
vague provisions may be considered open-textured standards intentionally 
designed by the drafters to condition on criteria that must be established by 
a tribunal ex post. For instance, vague provisions conditioning on terms 
like “reasonableness” or “best efforts” may be viewed not as drafting errors 
or unfortunate byproducts of concessions made during the CISG drafting 
process, but instead as valuable contracting terms that allow parties to 
allocate investments between the “front and back end of the contracting 
process.”149 
This section begins by describing the value that contracting parties can 
gain from using a mix of standards and rules in their contracts and arguing 
that CISG default standards may aid the parties in creating an optimal mix. 
It then rebuts two interrelated arguments, at least in the context of the 
CISG, that defaults in contract law should be comprised of rules rather than 
standards. First, it rebuts the contention that CISG defaults are sticky and 
that parties will, therefore, either be stuck with a standard when they would 
prefer a rule or they will have to spend an inefficiently large amount of 
effort to opt out of the default standard. Second, it rebuts the contention 
that the default set should be comprised primarily of rules rather than 
standards because standards fail to provide sufficient guidance to parties 
about their performance obligations and expose parties to the risk of moral 
hazard. Finally, this section concludes that the value parties can gain from 
having the default set comprised of open-textured standards might be 
 
 149. See Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 55, at 818. 
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eroded if CISG defaults framed as standards were slowly transformed into 
rules through application of the autonomous method of interpretation. 
1. Parties Can Gain Value by Including a Mix of Standards and Rules 
in their Contracts 
In Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, Professors Scott and 
Triantis address a core puzzle: why do sophisticated contracting parties 
regularly include and even negotiate over vague standards in their deals?150 
The significance of this puzzle cannot be overstated. The theory of 
incomplete contracting had led many commentators to conclude that parties 
were so concerned about uncertainty and litigation costs that they would 
avoid the use of vague standards like “best efforts” and “commercial 
reasonableness” altogether.151 These commentators’ conclusions, however, 
chaffed against commercial practice, creating a noticeable gap between 
theory and reality. Contracting parties not only use vague terms like “best 
efforts” in their agreements, they use them frequently. Professors Scott and 
Triantis offered a solution to this puzzle, explaining that parties regularly 
include a mix of precise and vague terms in their contracts because such a 
mix allows them to calibrate the efficiency of their transaction.152 
Contract terms may be precise, vague or anywhere in between. When 
parties choose a relatively precise or specific rule, they are increasing their 
ex ante investment.153 In other words, parties spend more money at the 
front end of the contracting process contemplating future contingencies and 
negotiating over terms specifying precise obligations in light of those 
contingencies. By investing more at the front end of the process, parties are 
hoping to leverage the information that they have about their shared 
contracting goals and incentives to maximize gains from trade in order to 
reduce ex post enforcement costs.154 On the other hand, when parties 
choose a relatively open-textured standard, they are decreasing their ex ante 
investment and increasing their expected ex post enforcement costs.155 
 
 150. See id. at 817 (observing that, despite the predictions of economic theory, parties regularly 
negotiate over and include vague contract terms in their deals). 
 151. See id. Indeed, many commentators went further and argued that contract default rules should 
be framed as rules rather than standards precisely because this is what most contracting parties would 
want. For more on this point, see id. at 848–51. 
 152. Id. at 817. 
 153. See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1071 (2009). 
 154. Id. (noting that parties “are exploiting their informational advantage (they know their 
contractual ends and have the right incentives to choose the best means to achieve them), but they are 
sacrificing the hindsight advantage that a court might have”). 
 155. See id. 
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Rather than spending time and money worrying about future contingencies 
and terms specifying precise obligations in light of those contingencies at 
the front end of the contracting process, parties are choosing to delegate to 
a future tribunal the task of specifying precise obligations. Such ex post or 
back-end specification is efficient, Professors Scott and Triantis argue, 
where the value to the parties of a decision maker’s hindsight outweighs 
the value that the parties would gain by specifying ex ante a more precise 
rule to govern their contract.156 
In short, as Professors Scott and Triantis state, parties use rules and 
standards to “maximize the incentive bang for the contracting buck.”157 
By reaching the optimal combination of front-end and back-end costs, 
parties can minimize the aggregate contracting costs of achieving a 
particular gain in contractual incentives. Conversely, for any given 
expenditure of contracting costs, the parties can reach the highest possible 
incentive gains by optimizing the allocation of their investment between 
the front and back ends.158 
Thus, both rules and standards are important tools in efficient contract 
design. Both rules and standards, in other words, have value to contracting 
parties. 
Given that both rules and standards have value to contracting parties, 
it is at least conceivable that an international sales law default set could be 
comprised of primarily rules, primarily standards or some combination of 
the two without necessarily having a negative impact on contract 
efficiency. Ultimately, of course, the question of what terms the majority of 
international contracting parties want in their sales contracts is an empirical 
one that could be tested by observing how frequently parties opt out of the 
Convention.159 Empirical evidence on this issue, however, is lacking.160 In 
 
 156. Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 55, at 819 (“The parties choose between 
front- and back-end proxy determination by comparing the informational advantage the parties may 
have at the time of contracting against the hindsight advantage of determining proxies in later 
litigation.”); id. at 842 (“The parties may view the court’s hindsight as an advantage or disadvantage 
depending on how much uncertainty has been resolved by the time contract performance is due.”). 
 157. Id. at 823. 
 158. Id. at 817. 
 159. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
1349, 1361 (2009) (“Observation of contracting-around behavior can thus provide an empirical test of 
the efficiency of a contractual default provision.”). 
 160. Others have also recognized this but suggested that the scant empirical evidence available 
indicates that the CISG does not contain defaults that most contracting parties want. For instance, 
Professors Scott and Gillette note that “[a] successful ‘substantively uniform’ [international sales law] 
would result in only a minimal amount of opting out.” Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 477. They go 
on to observe that, although hard empirical evidence is lacking, “our anecdotal evidence from 
conversations with attorneys who deal in international sales is that a substantial amount of opting out 
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the absence of such evidence, commentators have offered essentially two 
overlapping arguments for the proposition that default standards are, in 
general, less likely to be desirable to contracting parties than default rules. 
First, commentators have argued that defaults, whatever their content, 
become sticky, so that contracting parties have a trouble opting out of 
them. Commentators then pair this stickiness problem with a second 
contention: standards often fail to supply contracting parties with sufficient 
ex ante guidance about their performance obligations and expose them to 
the risk of moral hazard. In the following sections, I rebut both of these 
arguments. I then conclude by suggesting that the potential value of the 
CISG’s default standards would, in fact, be eroded if these standards were 
slowly crystallized into rules through an application of the autonomous 
method of interpretation. 
a. The Problem of Sticky Defaults 
Many contract defaults are sticky in the sense that parties who want to 
opt out of them may have a hard time doing so. At least after Ronald 
Coase’s revolutionary work, it seems clear that, if transaction costs are 
sufficiently low, contractual defaults are really irrelevant because parties 
can and will negotiate around suboptimal ones.161 “Parties should arrive at 
the same contractual risk allocations, either explicitly (by contracting 
around the defaults) or implicitly, (by choosing not to contract around the 
defaults) regardless of the content of the default rules.”162 Of course, 
transactions costs are not always low, as the default rule paradigm itself 
recognizes. More significantly, however, considerations other than drafting 
 
occurs.” Id. at 478; see also, e.g., Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, The CISG – Successes and 
Pitfalls, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 463 n.35 (2009) (discussing the few surveys that have been conducted 
suggesting that in the United States, Germany and Switzerland, a majority of contracting parties, 
particularly in commodities transactions, exercise their Article 6 rights to opt out of CISG coverage 
entirely). This evidence seems unpersuasive even for the general proposition that many contracting 
parties are opting out of the Convention. It seems even more unpersuasive for the proposition that the 
reason that parties are opting out is that the Convention fails to provide the terms that most contracting 
parties want. Indeed, even Professors Scott and Gillette concede that much of the sparse survey 
evidence that exists on opting out focuses on commodities associations, but such associations have 
complex self-regulatory regimes and thus stand to benefit little from any set of default rules. See 
Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 478. The fact that such associations tend to opt out of the Convention, 
then, says very little about the desirability of the Convention’s terms to other general parties not 
protected by self-regulatory regimes. Moreover, other recent surveys show that after an initial rejection 
of the CISG, business people seem more and more willing to accept the CISG. Bonell, supra note 9, at 
5. 
 161. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). The 
Coase theorem predicts that contracting parties will bargain to the efficient allocation of rights and 
responsibilities, without regard to initial entitlements so long as transaction costs are low. See, e.g., 
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 80–82 (2d ed. 1997). 
 162. Korobkin, supra note 72, at 621. 
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costs might cause contracting parties to stick with an otherwise undesirable 
default. Parties, that is, “might choose not to opt out of a legal default even 
when a better provision can easily be identified and articulated at a 
negligible drafting cost.”163 
A number of scholars have explored at length this notion that default 
rules, and contract default rules in particular, may be sticky.164 For 
purposes of this Article, it suffices to note that three principle explanations 
for the stickiness of defaults have been offered. First, stickiness may be 
explained on behavioral economic grounds. More specifically, stickiness 
may be due to the prevalence of the status quo bias.165 Individuals tend to 
systematically favor maintaining a current state of affairs—the status quo—
rather than switching to some alternative state.166 Second, stickiness may 
exist because proposing an opt out might send an undesirable signal to a 
contracting partner.167 This is particularly true in situations where repeat 
interactions are likely or necessary and thus where relational norms may 
become as important or more important than legal norms in enforcing the 
arrangement.168 Finally, defaults might be sticky because of network and 
learning benefits that arise because multiple parties are using and reusing a 
widely proliferated term.169 Essentially, when a term gets regularly used by 
multiple parties, it may become a shorthand signifier of many complex 
norms because it is now a familiar and commercially standard part of 
transactions. 
 
 163. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 85, at 651 (emphasis in original). 
 164. See, e.g., id. at 651–52 (noting that the “stickiness” of defaults has been discussed in a number 
of contexts); see generally Korobkin, supra note 72; Johnston, supra note 66; Lisa Bernstein, Social 
Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59 (1993); Marcel Kahan & Michael 
Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of 
Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997). The descriptions that follow are based largely on the 
taxonomy developed by Omri Ben-Shahar and John A.E. Pottow. 
 165. See generally Korobkin, supra note 72. 
 166. See id. at 625; see also, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, 
and Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (discussing 
the status quo bias in contract negotiations). 
 167. See Bernstein, supra note 164, at 71–72; see also, e.g., Johnston, supra note 66, at 626–27 
(arguing that some defaults are stickier than others because proposing an opt out would reveal 
particularly sensitive information that might allow the contracting partner to expropriate a greater share 
of the contractual surplus). 
 168. Bernstein, supra note 164, at 70; see also, e.g., Scott, supra note 59, at 1646 (“[W]here parties 
contemplate repeated interactions, neither party will breach an agreement if the expected gains from 
breaching are less than the expected returns from future transactions that breach would sacrifice.”); 
Avner Greif, Informal Contract Enforcement: Lessons from Medieval Trade, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 287, 287–95 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (describing how 
cultural and social standing impact self-enforcement). 
 169. See, e.g., Kahan & Klausner, supra note 164, at 718–23. 
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Although all three explanations of stickiness may be persuasive, there 
are sound reasons to believe that none of them applies (or they only apply 
with substantially reduced force) to CISG defaults. With respect to the 
status quo bias, there is little reason for parties using the CISG to feel a 
strong attachment to the current state of affairs—the defaults. The altering 
rule provided by Article 6 gives the parties virtually unfettered discretion to 
opt in or out of the default set entirely and equally unfettered discretion to 
vary or derogate from any particular default.170 Certainly, a distinction can 
and should be drawn between the stickiness of an altering rule and the 
underlying stickiness of the substantive default provisions, but when an 
altering rule expressly authorizes opt outs with few (or in the case of the 
CISG, essentially no) restrictions, it becomes less likely that any inherent 
stickiness in the underlying defaults matters. This is so because no CISG 
contracting party would have grounds to feel any strong entitlement to a 
particular CISG default. The status quo, in other words, is weak and easily 
alterable. It is reasonable to infer, then, that neither party would have a 
strong basis for preferring the default over other possible contract terms.171 
Similarly, although the concern about sending an undesirable signal 
might obtain with respect to CISG defaults, the strength of any such signal 
would be weak because the status quo is weak. The CISG regime self-
consciously places party autonomy and freedom at the center of its 
priorities. The fact that one party might propose an alteration of the CISG 
framework says little other than that the party is doing precisely what the 
Convention anticipates that parties will do—tailor the Convention to their 
particular transactional needs. 
Finally, at least if my proposal that tribunals resist the temptation to 
harden default standards into default rules is adopted, there would be few 
network or learning benefits to be gained by sticking with the CISG 
defaults. Instead, parties that choose to stick with the defaults would be 
doing so precisely because they believe that inclusion of an open-textured 
standard that does not have ex ante content and detail will be more efficient 
than inclusion of a more specific and definite rule. Accordingly, sticking 
with the defaults would mean only that the parties were asking courts to 
engage in an ex post and case-by-case consideration of disputes, which 
would provide little benefit to future parties using the same set of defaults. 
Parties would therefore feel little compulsion to stick to the defaults—they 
 
 170. See discussion, supra, at notes 82-84. 
 171. Significantly, there is also little research to suggest that firms suffer from cognitive biases. To 
the contrary, it is likely that firms tend to correct for cognitive biases, due to market pressures, even if 
individuals in the firm suffer from them. See Schwartz & Scott, note 53, at 551. 
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would do so only if the defaults were sensible in the context of their 
particular transaction. 
b. The Ex Ante Guidance and Potential Moral Hazard Problems with 
Default Standards 
Professors Gillette and Scott, in their seminal article on the political 
economy of the CISG drafting process, have argued that “[t]he 
promulgation of many vague default terms [in the CISG] is inconsistent 
with the need to balance standards with rules.”172 According to them, it is 
better policy for sales law to provide definite default rules and allow the 
parties to contract around those defaults with vague standards when they so 
choose. They, in other words, maintain that “[c]ourts and statutory 
drafters . . . are wise to interpret the absence of vague standards in 
particular cases as instructions to limit their construction to the specific 
terms of the contract.”173 
In their view, vague or open-textured default rules in international 
sales law can adversely impact contracting costs in at least two ways: 
First, contracting parties typically need specific guidance 
regarding their performance obligations. For example, a 
seller generally will want to know what quality level to 
produce in order to satisfy a contractual obligation. Telling 
that seller that its product must “at least satisfy the buyer’s 
ordinary purposes” is not a very helpful guide to 
satisfactory performance. . . . 
[Second] [s]tandards can also increase the risk of moral 
hazard and the evasion of contractual responsibilities. When 
it is unclear what any party must do, contracting parties 
have an incentive to interpret ambiguous circumstances in 
their favor.174 
These two arguments derive from nearly identical ones that Professor 
Scott has made about default standards in domestic contract law.175 
According to Professor Scott, “standards give rise to a variety of 
undesirable effects and thus should be avoided [as defaults] as a matter of 
contract policy.”176 These undesirable effects, as he makes clear in a 
footnote, are the same impacts that he and Professor Gillette refer to in the 
 
 172. Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 484. 
 173. Id. at 457. 
 174. Id. at 456–57. 
 175. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 53, at 601–05 (articulating the same two concerns 
regarding standards as defaults in domestic contract law). 
 176. Scott & Triantis, Embedded Options, supra note 68, at 1478. 
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context of standards as defaults in the CISG.177 Indeed, more recently, 
Professor Scott has reaffirmed his skepticism of standards as defaults in 
domestic law, arguing that “both theory and the available empirical 
evidence suggest that commercial parties would prefer a regime in which 
equitable override of formal contract doctrine is invoked only if 
specifically requested at the time the parties form their agreement.”178  
Although Professor Scott’s skepticism of standards as defaults in domestic 
law is well founded, I maintain that it should not extend to the CISG. 
With respect to the concern that standards as defaults fail to provide 
sufficient guidance to contracting parties, Professor Scott has conceded that 
“[p]arties that need specific guidance write detailed rules in their 
contracts.”179 Thus, parties in need of specific guidance “commonly 
ignore,” or opt out of, default standards articulated in domestic sales law 
and draft their own terms.180 Unless the defaults are sticky, then, it is not 
necessarily apparent why a default that fails to provide any particular 
contracting parties with sufficient guidance should be problematic. And, as 
discussed in the previous section, there are good reasons to believe that 
CISG defaults are not sticky. 
Professor Scott has also argued that if default standards provide little 
guidance to most parties and most parties therefore opt out of the defaults 
and draft their own more illuminating rules, lawmakers are simply wasting 
resources when they create the defaults.181 While this argument makes good 
sense in the context of United States domestic law (and potentially other 
domestic law) where the lawmakers are frequently courts creating, 
modifying or extending common law rules and thus constantly in the 
process of lawmaking, it does not hold up as well in the context of the 
CISG. As an initial matter, the bulk of the lawmaking process with respect 
to the CISG is complete and thus most of the creation costs have already 
been expended. These creation costs are, in essence, sunk costs that can be 
ignored for purposes of deciding whether the now-existing legal regime 
should be used.182 
 
 177. See id. at n.184. 
 178. Kraus & Scott, supra note 153, at 1028. 
 179. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 53, at 602. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See id. (“The state wastes drafting resources when it creates a standard that parties routinely 
reject.”); Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 457–58. 
 182. See, e.g., EARL L. GRINOLS, MICROECONOMICS 241 (1994) (explaining that sunk costs are 
“costs that cannot be altered or avoided by current or future decisions” and thus should not be 
considered when weighing future choices). 
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Moreover, as has already been discussed, little empirical evidence 
exists demonstrating that parties are, in fact, “routinely” opting out of the 
CISG defaults.183 Finally, even if they were, that fact alone would not 
necessarily undermine the framework of the CISG as a whole. To the 
contrary, the CISG’s robust commitment to freedom of contract—
authorizing parties to opt out of specific, undesirable default provisions—
may confer significant benefits on contracting parties when compared with 
more restrictive domestic sales law regimes. 
With respect to the concern that standards as defaults increase the risk 
of moral hazard, Professors Gillette and Scott concede that contracting 
parties themselves often choose to incorporate into their contracts vague, 
open-texture terms requiring ex post specification.184 “To be sure,” 
Professors Gillette and Scott point out, “commercial parties often include 
broad standards of reasonableness or effort in their contracts.”185 Thus, they 
recognize that open-textured standards can and often do have value to 
parties. Professors Scott and Gillette suggest, however, that “[w]hen it is 
unclear what any party must do, contracting parties have an incentive to 
interpret ambiguous circumstances in their favor.”186 They offer, as an 
example, a situation where the market price of a good dips below the 
contract price.187 Under such circumstances, a buyer may have the 
incentive to claim that it has a reasonable basis for refusing to pay the 
contract price.188 If the price term, in this hypothetical situation, is 
governed by a standard rather than a rule, then the buyer’s incentive to act 
opportunistically will be increased. Standards, in short, exacerbate the risk 
that one or both parties might act opportunistically. Standards only make 
sense, then, under particular conditions that are best identified by the 
parties themselves.  Because of this serious concern, Professors Scott and 
Gillette suggest that standards only be incorporated into a contract if the 
parties expressly include them: 
In any event, when these terms [standards] are useful, the 
parties can always include them in their contract at 
relatively low cost. Courts and statutory drafters, therefore, 
 
 183. As discussed previously, in footnote 160, there is some tentative evidence that parties opt out 
of the CISG as a whole under Article 6. While such evidence could be more damning, if true, it is far 
too threadbare to hold much weight. 
 184. Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 457. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id.; see also Schwartz & Scott, supra note 53, at 602–04 (arguing that default standards 
exacerbate the risk of moral hazard). 
 187. See Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 457. 
 188. See id. 
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are wise to interpret the absence of vague standards in 
particular cases as instructions to limit their construction to 
the specific terms of the contract.189 
In this way, parties can precisely communicate their particular mix of 
rules and standards to a tribunal, and thus ensure that a standard only 
governs when “the party on whom it confers discretion is otherwise 
motivated to take both parties’ interests equally into account.” 
Again, this argument mirrors, almost precisely, the same argument 
made by Professor Scott about domestic contract law.190 But, unlike 
domestic law, the CISG diminishes the concern that default standards 
might increase the risk of moral hazard. As discussed in the previous 
section addressing the stickiness of defaults, unlike domestic defaults 
where parties might not know what precise wording will operate to exclude 
enforcement of a default, Article 6 of the CISG provides definitive 
authorization for parties to derogate from or vary any particular provision 
of the Convention. Thus parties can refer specifically to the relevant 
Convention Article and provision from which they wish to derogate and 
thereby delineate, with the clarity that Professors Scott and Gillette insist 
parties need, their optimal mix of rules and standards to ensure that a 
standard governs only when both parties’ interests are equally taken into 
account. 
2. The Value of Open Textured Standards to Parties Might be Eroded 
if They Were Hardened into Rules 
Open-textured standards, as the previous sections argue, can and often 
do have value to contracting parties. Notably, even commentators 
concerned with non-uniformity of interpretive outcomes under open-
textured CISG provisions often come close to acknowledging that such 
provisions have value. For instance, one commentator complaining, in one 
breath, about the lack of uniform outcomes under the CISG, has, in another 
breath, recognized that, because the CISG was intended to apply “across 
the globe and in a wide variety of sale situations[,] . . . [i]t is vital that such 
an ambitious and broad document is open-textured and gives enough room 
to decision-makers to make it workable.”191 Whether these open-textured 
standards are incorporated into the contract because the parties have 
acquiesced to them as defaults or whether they are incorporated because the 
parties have specifically drafted them into the contract, opting out of more 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 53, at 602–05. 
 191. Notably, Nicholas Whittington, Comment on Professor Schwenzer’s Paper, 36 VICT. U. 
WELLINGTON L. REV. 809, 809–10 (2005). 
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definite rule-like defaults,192 they are an important part of efficient contract 
design. 
This conclusion compels another: tribunals interpreting open-textured 
CISG provisions should not diminish the value that such provisions provide 
to parties by attempting to render them, under the guise of interpretation, 
more definite for future cases. Tribunals, in other words, should not try to 
convert open-textured standards into definite rules.193 This is true even if 
the parties have the ability to freely contract out of the newly-hardened 
rules. It is no answer to contend that so long as the parties have such 
freedom it should make little difference to them whether a tribunal slowly 
adds definiteness to a formerly vague default rule because the parties can, 
at whatever point they find it efficient to do so, revise the slowly evolving 
rule-like default so that it is, once again, a vague standard requiring ex post 
specification. This is no answer because it assumes that ascertaining the 
current state of the evolution of the default is costless. Particularly in the 
context of the CISG, obtaining, translating and then interpreting CISG 
tribunal decisions from around the globe in order to determine the current 
state of CISG defaults would be far from costless. And, as Professors 
Gillette and Scott note, one of the key benefits to a uniform sales law is the 
“reduc[tion of] the costs to particular parties of learning about the legal 
consequences of any particular set of sales law rules.” 
Specification, then, of sufficiently detailed standards to make sense of 
such vague, open-textured provisions should take place on a case-by-case 
basis. Tribunals need not look outside of the context of the specific parties’ 
agreement when specifying these standards nor should they develop factors 
or rules that can be applied in future cases. Indeed, the point of a vague, 
open-textured standard is to avoid such rigidity and allow tribunals to 
address contingencies with the full benefit of hindsight. 
Formally, tribunals faced with hard cases involving intentionally 
vague provisions of the CISG should utilize Article 7(2) only insofar as it 
directs tribunals to consider one of the fundamental principles underlying 
the Convention: broad freedom of contract. This general principle, derived 
from Article 6, which provides the parties with virtually unfettered 
discretion to opt out of the Convention entirely or derogate from or vary its 
 
 192. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 6 (allowing the parties to exclude, derogate from or vary the 
effect of any provisions subject only to the constraints in Article 12). 
 193. Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 458–59. This benefit only exists so long as the sales law 
itself remains relatively constant. The gradual judicial hardening of intentionally soft default terms runs 
counter to the requirement that sales law remain predictable. 
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provisions,194 requires tribunals to adhere to the parties’ selection of 
contract provisions, including the parties’ choice to acquiesce to open-
textured defaults. 
B. A Taxonomy of Hard CISG Cases Recognizing the Value of Open-
Textured Standards 
Having established the potential value of default standards to 
contracting parties, I now turn to the introduction of a taxonomy of hard 
CISG cases. This taxonomy recognizes the importance of default standards 
while conceding that some CISG provisions may, in fact, be framed as 
unclear rules in need of additional clarification by tribunals. 
1. Matters Governed by but “Not Expressly Settled” in the CISG 
As the standard view of Article 7(2) correctly recognizes, the first type 
of hard case under the CISG involves matters that are governed by but not 
expressly settled in the Convention.195 The standard view, however, treats 
all gaps in this category the same, running them through what is 
conventionally viewed as a two-tiered interpretive methodology in Article 
7(2) in order to plug them permanently.196 This standard view fails to 
recognize that there are two distinct subcategories of hard cases involving 
matters governed by but not expressly settled in the CISG, each of which 
needs to be analyzed differently. 
a. Open-Textured Standards 
Many of the CISG’s provisions are open-textured and allow 
application of contextual inputs such as trade usage or custom or past 
dealings between the parties. For example, the CISG does not precisely 
define “fundamental breach,” a significant concept that impacts the 
availability of remedies.197 The only explanation of the term, which appears 
in Article 25, raises as many questions as it answers. It provides in 
 
 194. See, e.g., HONNOLD, supra note 40, at 4 (“[T]he Convention . . . responds to the power of 
agreement . . . . [It] does not interfere with the freedom of sellers and buyers to shape the terms of their 
transactions.”). 
 195. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 7(2) (stating that general principles on which the CISG is based 
should guide its interpretation and if these do not exist then private international law). 
 196. See supra Part II. 
 197. The CISG, supra note 3, distinguishes between a general and a fundamental breach. While a 
general breach entitles the aggrieved party to claim damages, the party is only entitled to the remedies 
of contract avoidance or the delivery of substitute goods if he can prove that the breach is fundamental. 
With respect to buyer’s remedies, see Article 49(1)(a), Article 51(1) & (2) (avoidance), and Article 
46(2) (substitute delivery). With respect to seller’s remedy, see Article 64(1)(a) (avoidance). With 
respect to common remedies, see Article 72(1), Article 73(1) & (2) (avoidance in case of anticipatory 
breach and installment contracts). 
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pertinent part that “[a] breach of contract committed by one of the parties is 
fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other party as substantially 
to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract.”198 No 
express provision, however, explains what a detriment that substantially 
deprives a party of what they were entitled to expect might be. 
Another example of an open-textured provision in the CISG is Article 
39 and 43’s reference to “a reasonable time.”199 Article 39 essentially deals 
with warranties of quality. Article 43 essentially deals with warranties of 
title. Both Articles provide, in pertinent part, that buyers cannot recover for 
breaches of these warranties if they “not give notice to the seller specifying 
the nature of the [lack of conformity or third party claim] within a 
reasonable time.”200 The CISG does not, however, define what constitutes a 
“reasonable time.” 
Fundamental breach and reasonable time are not the only concepts 
that are left vague in the CISG. Professor Van Alstine has shown that in no 
fewer than thirty-one instances, the CISG “variously measures the parties’ 
conduct from the perspective of a ‘reasonable person,’ defines rights or 
obligations with reference to what is ‘reasonable’ or ‘unreasonable,’ [or] 
requires certain actions or notices within a ‘reasonable’ time.”201 
As the previous sections of this Article have argued, such open-
textured standards may well provide value to contracting parties. 
Accordingly, these standards should not be hardened into rules through an 
accretion of CISG case law or decisional practice. 
2. Unclear Rules 
Although some vague provisions of the CISG are intended to serve as 
open-textured default standards, not all vague provisions fall into this 
category. Instead, some provisions of the CISG are vague or imprecise—
unclear—rules. The CISG contains some unclear or vague rules for the 
reasons articulated by proponents of the more standard system of 
classifying CISG interpretation challenges. In many instances, unclear rules 
exist in the CISG because of compromises during the convention’s 
drafting. 202 As one commentator has noted, “[i]t is clear from the 
 
 198. CISG, supra note 3, art. 25. 
 199. CISG, supra note 3, arts. 39, 43. 
 200. CISG, supra note 3, arts. 39(1), 43(1). 
 201. See, e.g., Van Alstine, supra note 101, at 751–52 (citing, among others CISG arts. 34, 
35(2)(b), 37, 48(1), 60(a), 75, 77, 79(1), 79(4), 85, 86(1), 86(2), 87, 88(2), 88(3)). 
 202. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 12, at 139. 
BLAIR_PROOF3 3/28/2011  2:53:35 PM 
2011] HARD CASES UNDER THE CISG 315 
Convention’s drafting history that many of the vague and ambiguous terms 
that ended up in the CISG were the result of deliberate compromise.”203 
For instance, although Article 1(1) states that the CISG applies only to 
“contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in 
different states,”204 neither the term “sale” nor the term “goods” is defined 
by the CISG, except for exclusions of particular transactions.205 Unlike 
intentionally vague, open-textured default terms like “fundamental breach” 
discussed in the previous section, unclear rules—like ambiguity about what 
constitutes a good and thus triggers application of the CISG—must be 
formally specified for purposes of the pending case and for future cases. 
Distinguishing, at the margins, between the terms in the CISG that are 
intentionally vague, and thus designed to be standards, and terms that are 
unclear rules may prove, of course, challenging. But recognizing the 
distinction is the first critical step. With respect to the former, as the 
previous section argues, tribunals should not engage the two-tier 
interpretive hierarchy of Article 7(2). Instead, they should heed the will of 
the parties and specify standards only contextually and provisionally. With 
respect to the latter, however, Article 7(2) sets out the interpretive approach 
that tribunals must take. In line with the conventional approach to CISG 
interpretation, tribunals, in this situation, should first look to the general 
principles of the CISG, interpreting the provision at issue autonomously to 
provide a fixed and durable rule. Only if the general principles, as viewed 
autonomously, do not provide an answer should a tribunal, under Article 
7(2), turn to the domestic law applicable by virtue of the rules of private 
international law for assistance. In any event, however, tribunals, faced 
with imprecise or unclear rules, have an obligation to disambiguate those 
rules because contracting default rules are public goods (and in the context 
of the CISG, internationally shared public goods).206 
C. Derogation or Variation of CISG Provisions by the Parties 
The standard classification of hard CISG cases fails to account for a 
significant category of hard cases, those created by gaps formed when the 
parties exercise their freedom under Article 6 to derogate from or vary 
provisions of the CISG. As previously discussed, there are, in fact, few 
 
 203. Id. at 140. 
 204. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 1(1). 
 205. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 2 (excluding certain transactions from the scope of “sale”), art. 3 
(excluding certain transactions in which the buyer supplies materials for goods or in which the “seller” 
primarily provides labor or services). 
 206. Goetz & Scott, supra note 49, at 276, 278; see also, e.g., Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 447 
(observing that “[s]ales law default rules thus are public goods” and citing Goetz & Scott). 
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limitations on this broad freedom of contract,207 so tribunals must account 
for the probability that parties may take advantage of this freedom in ways 
that can create two different types of hard cases. 
1. Vague Standards 
Sometimes, the parties may derogate from or vary the provisions in 
the CISG in ways that generate vague standards. For instance, parties might 
take an otherwise definite default rule, like Article 38(2)’s allowance that 
“examination [of goods] may be deferred until after the goods have arrived 
at their destination” if the contract provides for the carriage of the goods,208 
and eliminate it altogether. In the instance of Article 38, this would leave 
subdivision (1) intact, which provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he buyer 
must examine the goods, or cause them to be examined, within as short a 
period as is practicable in the circumstances.”209 The result would be that 
the parties would have replaced a definite rule—the buyer could wait at 
least until the goods were transported to examine them. With an open-
textured default, the buyer must examine the goods within a reasonable 
time, which under the particular circumstances could conceivably precede 
their carriage. 
As discussed previously in section A(1), open-textured standards play 
a valuable role in contract law. Tribunals should not minimize or 
undermine the value gained by parties from incorporating vague standards 
into their contracts by attempting to transform those standards into fixed 
rules. This conclusion is warranted both when the parties simply opt into an 
open-textured default, as previously discussed, and certainly when the 
parties exercise their freedom under Article 6 to alter or derogate from an 
otherwise applicable CISG provision. 
2. Creation of Unclear Rules 
In some instances, parties may derogate from or vary provisions of the 
CISG under Article 6 in ways that unwittingly create unclear rules. For 
instance, the parties might decide to derogate from Article 33 altogether. 
Article 33 specifies three options for when a seller is obligated to deliver 
 
 207. The parties may not derogate from or vary the effect of Article 12, which essentially states that 
some member states may have made a declaration under Article 96 effectively requiring parties, in 
those member states or doing business in those member states, to evidence their contracts, 
modifications, or terminations with a writing. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 12. And, although the 
Convention does not expressly mention it, there are likely a few other provisions that the parties cannot 
derogate from—for example, public international law provisions contained in Articles 89-101. See 
Ferrari, supra note 76, at 19. 
 208. CISG, supra note 3, art. 38(2). 
 209. CISG, supra note 3, art. 38(1). 
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goods to the buyer.210 First, the seller must deliver the goods on or by any 
date “fixed by or determinable from the contract.”211 If no such date can be 
ascertained, then the seller must deliver the goods within a reasonable 
time.212 Without Article 33, the seller’s obligation under Article 31, to 
deliver the goods at issue, is rendered unworkably vague. By eliminating 
Article 33, the parties, in this hypothetical, would have generated not an 
open-textured standard but an unclear or imprecise obligation. 
When faced with situations where parties have exercised their freedom 
under Article 6 to create, presumably unwittingly, an unclear or imprecise 
obligation rather than an open-textured standard, tribunals should use the 
conventionally understood precepts of Article 7(2) to disambiguate the 
situation. In this respect, tribunals should address party-created unclear 
rules in the same manner as they address unclear rules existing independent 
of the parties’ actions. 
D. Matters Falling Outside of the Scope of the CISG 
Article 4 establishes the essential scope of the CISG, stating that 
“[t]his Convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and 
the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a 
contract.”213 Article 4 goes on to point out that the Convention is not 
concerned with “the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of 
any usage” or “the effect which the contract may have on the property in 
the goods sold.”214 Thus, as previously discussed, the CISG does not 
address unconscionability, capacity defenses, fraudulent inducement or the 
rights of a bona fide purchaser to goods that turn out to have been stolen.215 
It also carves out consumer transactions216 or mixed contracts for the sale 
of goods and services where the services are the “preponderant part of the 
obligations of the party who furnishes the goods.”217 Similarly, it does not 
apply to the sale of certain kinds of property, such as stocks, shares, 
investment securities, money, electricity or ships, vessels or aircraft.218 The 
 
 210. CISG, supra note 3, art. 33. 
 211. CISG, supra note 3, arts. 33(a)-(b). 
 212. CISG, supra note 3, art. 33(c). 
 213. CISG, supra note 3, art. 4. 
 214. CISG, supra note 3, arts. 4(a)-(b). 
 215. See supra note 76. 
 216. CISG, supra note 3, art. 2(a). 
 217. CISG, supra note 3, art. 3(2). 
 218. See CISG, supra note 3, arts. 2(b)–(f). 
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Convention “does not apply to the liability of the seller for death or 
personal injury caused by the goods to any person.”219 
Ultimately then, it is clear that “the CISG does not govern all the legal 
questions which may arise in connection with an international sales 
transaction.”220 Nevertheless, the precise delineation of matters falling 
within the scope of the CISG (whether or not they are expressly settled in 
it)221 or outside of the CISG’s coverage is difficult at best. As one 
commentator has pointed out: 
The phrase “governs only” (formation, rights, and obligations) is too 
narrow and should be read as “governs without doubt,” for the Convention 
also governs interpretation of statements, conduct, and contracts (Article 
8), the applicability of usage and customs (Article 9), (freedom of) form 
(Article 11 . . .), termination or modification of contracts by agreement 
(Article 29(1)), [as well as] interpretation of the Convention and gap 
filling . . . .222 
Because the boundaries of the CISG are challenging to chart, hard 
cases may arise when tribunals are faced with matters that might or might 
not fall within the ambit of the Convention.223 
CONCLUSION 
CISG was formally uniform at the time of its adoption—it used the 
same words in all of the jurisdictions adopting it.224 But uniform words are 
not enough to guarantee uniform application. Indeed, to date, courts and 
commentators have reached divergent interpretive positions with respect to 
many of the CISG’s provisions. In the view of many commentators this 
situation poses a dire threat to the continued validity or efficacy of the 
Convention. Without greater uniformity of results, these commentators 
 
 219. CISG, supra note 3, art. 5. 
 220. Schlechthiem, supra note 44, at 64. 
 221. See supra Part II.A. 
 222. Schlechtriem, supra note 44, at 64. 
 223. Certainly, courts may also be faced with easy cases where one of the Convention’s express 
carve outs applies. In such cases, courts need only abide by Judge Easterbrook’s simple and universal 
rule—apply the carve out. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 61. 
 224. More precisely, the CISG was co-drafted, simultaneously, in six languages. See Steven Walt, 
Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 671, 676 (1999). This fact has caused 
some commentators to fear that inaccuracies and discrepancies might exist between the “official” texts 
of the CISG, not to mention between the “unofficial” texts produced in other languages, thus increasing 
the risks of inconsistent interpretive results. See, e.g., Rose Kennedy, Much Ado About Noting: 
Problems in the Legal Translation Industry, 14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 423, 431 (2000) (“The lack of 
a controlling version among the CISG language versions is especially problematic, as some sections of 
some translations differ and thus would bring about inconsistent results.”). 
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argue, the CISG will, over time, fail to supply standard solutions to similar 
contracting problems and thus fail to supply the sort of predictability on 
which the Convention was premised. 
I have argued, however, that these commentators start with an 
exaggerated expectation about the kind and degree of uniformity called for 
by the CISG. The conventional view about CISG interpretation, I contend, 
rests on a binary reading of Article 7(2) coupled with an insistence on 
autonomous interpretation in virtually all CISG hard cases. In so doing, it 
oversimplifies the classification of hard CISG cases and thus overlooks at 
least two significant categories of cases for which uniformity of outcomes 
is not an appropriate goal—situations in which a CISG default provision 
was cast by the drafters of the Convention as an open-textured standard and 
situations in which the parties have modified a CISG rule to make it an 
open-textured standard. 
To rectify the shortcomings of the conventional view of CISG 
interpretation, I have proposed a more nuanced taxonomy of hard CISG 
cases. The real innovation of this proposed taxonomy is its recognition that 
the methodological uniformity called for in Article 7, combined with a 
proper regard for the structure of the Convention and its robust emphasis 
on freedom of contract, compels the conclusion that case-by-case 
differences in the interpretations of some provisions of the CISG are not 
only inevitable but may be necessary. Accordingly, this proposed 
taxonomy respects Article 7’s mandate of uniformity of interpretive 
methodology while more accurately reflecting the substantive design of the 
Convention. It also helps, I suggest, to recalibrate expectations about 
uniformity, thereby establishing a framework for future work that can 
evaluate whether or not the remaining non-uniformity in CISG outcomes is 
significant enough to undermine the CISG as a whole. 
In short, I believe that the CISG represents a remarkable achievement 
in the harmonization of international sales. While uniformity of outcomes 
in all hard CISG cases is, I believe, a quixotic goal, uniformity in the 
interpretive methodology of the CISG is not. The continued validity and 
efficacy of the Convention should not be impugned merely because 
tribunals respect the contractual wishes of the parties and render case-by-
case decisions based on the particularized circumstances facing parties. 
These sorts of decisions are not only to be expected, but they are proper, 
given the open-textured nature of many of the Convention’s default rules. 
So long as tribunals use a uniform method of ex post specification of these 
open-textured standards, I believe that there is hope that the Convention 
can continue to offer contracting parties a valuable framework for 
international sales. 
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